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EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF SECURED CREDIT
Ronald J. Mann
"I would say that there's a lower cost in an unsecured situation because of all the brain damage in going out and getting appraisals and all
that other bullshit [in a secured situation], where in an unsecured deal
you just do the deal and you get the money ...

."

Telephone Interview

with William S.H. Stuart, President, WSHS Enterprises, Inc. (July
1995).
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EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF SECURED CREDIT
Ronald J. Mann*
Granting collateral to secure loans is a prominentfeature of the U.S. economy, but,
surprisingly,we do not understand how borrowers and lenders decide whether to engage
in a secured or an unsecured transaction. In this Article, Professor Mann argues that
existing theories of secured lending are inadequate because the theories' predictions have
not been tested against empirical data. To understand the actual pattern of secured
credit, Professor Mann interviewed more than twenty borrowers and lenders in various
sectors of the economy. Based on the evidence gathered in these interviews, as well as on
preexisting empirical studies, this Article develops a model of the borrower's decision to
grant collateral that focuses on the borrower's perceptions of the costs and benefits of
secured and unsecured transactions. Granting collateral lowers the aggregate costs of a
lending transaction by lowering the pre-loan perception of the risk of default. Secured
credit can do this not only by increasing the lender's ability to collect the debt forcibly
through liquidation of the collateral, but also in less direct ways: by decreasing the borrower's ability to obtain subsequent loans; by increasing the lender's leverage over the
borrower's activities; and by repairing the loan-induced differentiation of the incentives
of the borrower and the lender. Conversely, a grant of collateral can increase the costs of
a lending transaction by increasing the costs of entering the transaction as well as the
costs of administering the loan. In the Article's final section, Professor Mann uses the
decision-based model to explain three separate aspects of the pattern of secured credit:
the relatively infrequent use of secured credit by companies with strong financial records,
the relation between the use of collateraland the durationof the debt, and the apparently
low rate of retention of security interests by suppliers.

* Associate Professor, Washington University School of Law, St. Louis, and Research Fellow,
Olin Center for Business, Law, and Economics. I dedicate this project to my wife, Allison, whose
patient encouragement and persistent criticism are responsible not only for my completion of the
Article, but also for innumerable substantive improvements of its contents. I also thank Barry
Adler, Stuart Banner, Bernard Black, Jim Bowers, Mark Gergen, Steve Harris, Tom Jackson,
Marcel Kahan, Dan Keating, Jim Krier, Lynn LoPucki, Nancy Rapoport, Bob Rasmussen, George
THantis, Elizabeth Warren, Jay Westbrook, and Ben Wilner for comments on earlier versions of
this project. I thank Mark Ramseyer and my colleague Curtis Milhaupt for assistance in locating
and translating Japanese materials. My thoughts on this topic also benefited from the discussion
in workshops at the University of Michigan Law School, the University of Texas School of Law,
and the Olin Center for Business, Law, and Economics. Finally, I acknowledge Norman Beck,
Mike Bloomquist, Bob Droney, and David Royster for their able research assistance.
I am indebted to the individuals who took time away from their productive affairs to aid my
academic pursuits. Leaving aside those who requested anonymity, the individuals and their companies are as follows: Sonia W. Hamstra and Gordon S. Massie (American General Corporation);
Jocelyn Sears (American General Realty Advisers, Inc.); William J. Kimmins, Jr. (Anheuser-Busch
Companies, Inc.); Richmond W. Coburn and Clyde F. Wendel (The Boatmen's National Bank of
St. Louis); Naran U. Burchinow, Richard Greco, and James C. Meals (Deutsche Financial Services Corporation); R.O. Wirengard (Eveready Battery Company, Inc.); Andrea J. Dunn and
David R. Edlund (Hewlett-Packard Company); Harry C. Mueller (Mercantile Bank of St. Louis
NA.); Joe DeKunder and Cynthia C. Sanford (NationsBank of Texas, N.A.); William S.H. Stuart
(WSHS Enterprises, Inc.); Carl W. Evans (Texas Pneumatic Tools, Inc.); and Joseph W. Robertson, Jr. (Weingarten Realty Investors).
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Granting collateral to secure loans is a dominant feature of this
country's commerce: domestic lenders currently hold about two trillion
dollars in secured debt.' At present, policymakers are updating the
legal systems under which creditors take real and personal property as
collateral. For example, the American Law Institute recently adopted
a Restatement of Mortgages that sets forth the principles governing
security interests in real property. 2 Similarly, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute are nearing completion of a lengthy project to update Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which governs security interests in
3
personal property.
Although grants of collateral are prominent in our economy and in
the pages of academic journals, 4 we know astonishingly little about
the most fundamental question regarding secured lending: why people
do it. The limitations of our understanding have been evident since
Alan Schwartz's 1981 article in the Journal of Legal Studies questioned the efficiency of secured credit.5 Schwartz argued that most of
the obvious explanations for secured credit suggest that rational borrowers would secure their debt to the greatest degree practicable.6
1 I derived the two trillion dollar figure by aggregating conservative estimates of outstanding
secured debt for federally insured depository institutions, insurance companies, and nonbank finance companies. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INS. CORP., STATISTICS ON BANKING C-6 tbl.RC-4, E-6
tbl.RC-14 (i995) (reporting that federally insured depository institutions at the end of 1995 held a
total of $1.6 trillion in loans secured by real estate); BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., ANNUAL STATISTICAL DIGEST: 1994, at 71 thl.33 (1995) (reporting that life insurance
companies held over $215 billion of mortgage debt at the end of 1994); Michael D. Sherman,
Survey of Asset-Based and Other Competitive Lending Activities, THE SECURED LENDER,
Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 18, i8 (reporting estimates of asset-based lending by commercial finance companies in 1992 ranging from $96 to $3IO billion).
2 The American Law Institute approved the final draft in May i996. See American Law
Institute Nears Finish Line on Lawyer Ethics, Product Liability Projects, 64 U.S.L.W. 2739,
2739, 2747-48 (May 28, 1996).
3 See U.C.C. Revised Art 9 (Discussion Draft 1996).
4 During the last two years, Article 9 has been the focus of two major law review symposia.
See Symposium on the Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 80 VA. L. REv.
1783 (1994); Symposium: "Managing the Paper Trail": Evaluating and Reforming the Article 9
Filing System, 79 MINN. L. REV. 519 (i995). As the following discussion suggests, I analyze the
empirical question of why people use secured credit, rather than the normative question of
whether we should let them.
S See Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities:A Review of Current Theories, IO J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7-30 (,98I). Schwartz's article relied heavily on an earlier article
published by Tom Jackson and Tony Kronman. See, e.g., id. at io n.27, ii n.28, 23 n.4 (citing
Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financingand PrioritiesAmong Creditors,
88 YALE LJ.1143 (I979)). But Jackson and Kronman did not ignite much controversy because
they did not express any significant doubts about the general desirability or efficiency of secured
credit.
6 See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 24-25 (claiming that explanations that "predict[] that, other
things equal, firms will issue as much secured debt as they can" are inaccurate given that "[f]irms
.. often seem not to issue as much secured debt as their assets would justify").
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Observing that many borrowers do not secure all of the debt that they
can, Schwartz posed what Barry Adler has labeled the "ubiquity puzzle" of secured credit: "The puzzle is that secured credit appears valua7
ble but is not ubiquitous."
Since the publication of Schwartz's article, numerous scholars have
taken up his challenge to explain why secured lending is - or is not
an efficient practice." Although some scholars who have written in
the area might disagree, it is fair to say that none of those attempts
has succeeded. 9 The central problem with the existing explanations is
methodological. Because previous commentators generally have focused on the efficiency question, they have, with very few exceptions,10
approached the problem from the top down. Specifically, most scholars have started their analysis with reductionist factual assumptions
and then applied abstract economic tools to build a theoretical superstructure upon those assumptions." Only at the end of the process, if
7 Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-PriorityPuzzle, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 73, 74 ('993). Adler comments: "The solution should address this 'ubiquity puzzle' directly." Id.
8 For synopses of the literature, see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80
VA. L. REV. 1887, 1892-96 ('994), and Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured ransactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REv. io67, 1073--83 (1989).
9 Alan Schwartz certainly has rejected the attempts to date, taking up the cudgel once every
five years or so to critique other scholars' efforts to solve the puzzle. See Alan Schwartz, The
Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 1055-66 (1984) [hereinafter Schwartz,
The ContinuingPuzzle] (taking issue with Saul Levmore's monitoring and free-ridership explanation for the lack of secured credit and with J.J. White's interest rate and risk-aversion theories for
the lack of secured credit); Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities,iS J. LEGAL STUD. 209,
243-47 (1989) [hereinafter Schwartz, Theory] (rejecting several authors' suggestions that secured
credit serves a signaling function); Alan Schwartz, Taking the Analysis of Security Seriously, 8o
VA. L. REv. 2073, 2077-86 (1994) [hereinafter Schwartz, Taking Analysis Seriously].
10 Lynn LoPucki emphasizes the absence of empirical support for prior analyses of the problem. See LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1894 n.23 (characterizing the actual pattern of secured and

unsecured debt as the glass slipper from the Cinderella story and criticizing prior scholars for
manipulating "the shape of the slipper" in order to allow their theories to slip into it). Although
his article emphasizing that point does not attempt to explain the pattern of secured and unsecured debt, he addresses aspects of the empirical pattern of secured credit in a number of
places. See, e.g., id. at 1896. I address those portions of his analysis that are relevant to my
discussion. See infra 643-44, 67o-71, note 219.
11 For example, Barry Adler and George G. Triantis have written two of the most promising
recent articles in this debate. See Adler, supra note 7; George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under
Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1992). Both scholars offer lucid and
sophisticated theoretical expositions of why parties should issue secured and unsecured debt, but
make no attempt to determine whether the theories are consistent with the observed patterns of
secured and unsecured debt. George Triantis, for example, notes that his two theories produce
"predictions that conflict" with each other, but he does not state which prediction is correct. Id.
at 256. He attempts to resolve the "tension ... by recognizing that the two theories ... operate
in different contexts," but does nothing to explain what those contexts might be or what factors
might lead to the operation of one theory instead of the other. Id. Barry Adler closes his article
with a section titled "Predictions and Evidence," Adler, supra note 7, at 96, but the only evidence
that he considers is a single empirical study, see id. at 97 n.86. He does offer some specific

1997]

EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF SECURED CREDIT

at all, have these scholars made any serious effort to compare their

theories about the efficiency justifications for secured credit with the
actual pattern of secured credit. At that point, when the theory already has been developed, the consideration of empirical evidence almost inevitably becomes a cursory afterthought instead of an integral

part of the analysis.
As a result, none of the existing theories explains the actual pattern
of secured credit in the economy. 12 The signaling hypothesis, which
Alan Schwartz frequently discusses, provides one of the clearest exam-

ples of this incongruity. 13 The hypothesis predicts that the strongest
companies will be more likely to grant collateral as a way to signal
their strength and ability to pay.' 4 That prediction, however, is inconsistent with the most well-established aspect of actual practice: the
strongest companies in our economy ordinarily do not secure their

debt.' 5
predictions, but he leaves for others the empirical research needed to test those predictions. See
id. at 97-98 (offering predictions as well as proposals for future empirical study). As I explain
below, the available empirical evidence, including the information that I have collected, strongly
rebuts Adler's conclusions. See infra pp. 669-71.
12 Jim Bowers explains:
In many cases, the resulting theories predict that debtors will do all or none of their borrowing on a secured basis, so that the validity of the analysis is undermined by the empirical observation that firms tend to employ a mix of secured and unsecured borrowing.
Others suffer from a shortcoming of scope. While they may explain certain special types of
security devices, they do not justify other sorts of secured borrowing actually observed.
James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the
Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. Rav. 27, 60 (iggi) (footnotes omitted); see
also F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393, 2419 (1986) ('These
[existing] theories, however, appear to prove too much; they fail to explain why firms are not all
secured to the hilt."); Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle, supra note o, at Io6z (arguing that J.J.
White's theory must be incorrect because it predicts that "debtors always would borrow on a
secured basis until they ran out of free assets"); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured
Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901, 902 (1986) (noting the "inability [of existing explanations] to
explain completely the patterns of secured and unsecured credit that are actually observed").
13 See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 14-2i (discussing the signaling hypothesis); Schwartz, Theory, supra note 9, at 245-46 (same).
14 The "signaling" explanation is essentially identical to the conventional explanation for secured credit in the finance literature, which states that secured credit is a device used to remedy
the problem of "asymmetric information" - that is, the borrower's possession of greater knowledge about the prospects for future performance. See, e.g., STUART I. GREENBAUM & ANJAN V.
THAKOR, CONTEMPORARY FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 225-27 (1995); David Besanko & Anjan
V. Thakor, Competitive Equilibrium in the Credit Market Under Asymmetric Information, 42 J.
ECON. THEORY x67, 168 (1987) (summarizing the conclusion that asymmetric information causes
"low-risk borrowers [to] put up more collateral than high-risk borrowers").
Is The general absence of secured debt from the balance sheets of the most creditworthy companies is commonly asserted as an anecdotal matter. See, e.g., Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 929, 969-70 (2985). The most persuasive empirical evidence appears in Berger and Udell's
299o article. See Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Collateral,Loan Quality, and Bank Risk,
25 J. MONETARY ECON. 22, 27-40 (iggo) (examining Federal Reserve data on over one million
business loans and concluding that collateral is more frequently granted on riskier loans); see also
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This Article responds to the failure of the existing theories by rejecting the methodological approach that underlies the existing debate.
Theorizing about the efficiency of secured credit without having even
a rough idea of the situations in which parties use secured credit is a
pointless exercise. Moreover, whatever the value of purely theoretical
assessments of the efficiency of secured credit, understanding the reasons that motivate parties to use secured credit in practice is useful for
the designers of the legal systems that permit -

and limit -

its use.

As policymakers struggle with the propriety of a legal system that has
fostered a dramatic growth in the amount of secured credit, 16 discovering exactly why parties are using secured credit is more important
than ever. Thus, in contrast to the top-down analysis of previous
scholars, who have started with the macro-question - whether secured credit is an efficient institution - this Article works from the
bottom up, building on a firm empirical investigation of the microquestion - what motivates parties to choose between secured and unsecured credit. Until we can explain those motivations, we cannot intelligently evaluate how the legal system should respond to parties' use
of secured credit.
This goal drives my analysis in two directions that differentiate it
from the work of prior commentators. First, understanding the pattern of secured credit requires an examination of the perceptions of the
players in the lending market that lead them to secure (or refrain from
securing) their lending transactions. Decisions about securing credit
can be understood only from the perspective of the decisionmaker.
And what is relevant to the decisionmaker is not the actual return on
a loan, but the return anticipated at the time that the decisionmaker
decides whether to enter the transaction. Thus, an understanding of
the decisionmaker's perspective can come only from a focus on how
the decisionmaker perceives the costs and benefits of secured and unsecured credit before the loan is made.
Second, because the ultimate goal is to understand why some borrowers choose secured credit and others do not, an examination of the
wide variety of contexts in which the decisions are made is crucial.
The nature of the decisions in question - complex, multifactored, and
Scott, supra note 12, at 940 (reporting earlier studies that indicate that "[m]ost secured debt is
issued by relatively small, young and growing firms'). See generally infra section lI'.A.I (discussing empirical evidence). Several scholars have argued that the inconsistency of the signaling hypothesis with the observed pattern demonstrates the fallacy of signaling as an explanation for the
use of secured credit. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1926 n.149 ("That loans should be
unsecured when they are to the largest, financially strongest firms is not particularly startling.
But it does dispatch the 'signaling' theory from the economic literature ... ."); James J. White,
Efficiency Justificationsfor Personal Property Security, 37 VANED. L. REV. 473, 477 (1984).
16 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death ofLiability, io6 YALE L.J. i, x8-9 (1996) (describ-

ing the expansion of secured debt fostered by Article 9).

1997]

strategic -

EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF SECURED CREDIT

suggests that neither abstract theoretical analysis nor the

relatively limited existing statistical information captures the richness
and ambiguity of the actual relations. To build on the existing empiri-

cal data, I collected anecdotal information about the actual operation
of the commercial lending market by interviewing twenty-three indi-

viduals 17
employed by borrowers and lenders in different sectors of that
market.

This Article is not the first to use interviews with borrowers and
lenders to learn about the market for secured credit. Both Bob Scott

and Alan Schwartz have relied on interviews with market participants
in their work; Scott and Schwartz appear, however, to have limited

their interviews to large commercial lenders and (even less usefully)
their lawyers.' Given the immense variety of transactions in the lending market, interviews limited to any one sector seem unlikely to shed
much light on the overall pattern.
I constructed a set of interviews designed to mirror as closely as
possible the lending market as a whole. On the borrowing side, I
viewed borrowers as differentiated by the size of the company, the
company's access to publicly traded debt, and the company's line of
business. Accordingly, I interviewed responsible individuals at large
and small companies, ranging from two publicly traded Fortune ioo
companies'19 to several small, closely held companies (including one

that has never turned a profit).20 I also interviewed several borrowers
that borrow exclusively in the private debt market, 2' a borrower in
17 The interviews typically lasted from 45 minutes to an hour. I proceeded loosely in accordance with a script of questions I prepared in advance, but allowed the interview subjects free rein
to lead the interview to topics that they found important Although I used some of the same
questions for many of the interviews, I tailored the scripts to each interview to focus on the likely
experience of the subject To help ensure a spontaneous response, I did not provide the scripts of
questions to the interview subjects in advance, but I gave them a general idea of the range of
topics that I planned to cover. If practical, I conducted the interviews in person; in several cases,
however, I conducted them by telephone. To ensure the accuracy and verifiability of the conclusions that I draw in this Article, I recorded and transcribed all of the interviews. Copies of the
transcripts are on file with the Harvard Law School Library and the author. I also obtained
standard loan documents from a number of the lenders whom I interviewed; copies of these documents also are on file with the Harvard Law School Library and the author. In 6 of the 23
interviews, the interview subjects requested anonymity. The transcripts for those interviews have
been altered to preserve the anonymity of the subjects.
18 See Schwartz, Theory, supra note 9, at 217 n.17; Scott, supra note 12, at 939.
19 Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. and Hewlett-Packard Company.
20 Five of the borrowers are closely held: WSHS Enterprises, Inc., Texas Pneumatic Tools,
Inc., an anonymous mall developer, an anonymous pharmaceutical company, and an anonymous
shopping center developer. The pharmaceutical company has not yet turned a profit. See Telephone Interview with Anonymous President of Pharmaceutical Company (July 17, 1995) [hereinafter Pharmaceutical Company Interview] (transcript at 7, on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
21 WSHS Enterprises, Inc., Texas Pneumatic Tools, Inc., and the anonymous mall developer,
anonymous pharmaceutical company, and anonymous shopping center developer.
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the process of issuing its first public debt issue, 2 2 and several borrowers that are active in the public debt markets.2 3 Finally, I interviewed
individuals operating in various lines of business, including real estate, 24 pharmaceuticals, 25 industrial tooling,26 manufacturing, 27 and
computer technology and service. 28 On the lending side, I interviewed
representatives of each of the major types of institutional lenders in
our economy - insurance companies, 2 9 banks,30 and asset-finance
companies 31 - as well as several noninstitutional lenders who extend
32
significant amounts of trade credit to their customers.
Because of the relatively small sample size, the results of my interviews are not useful for producing statistically significant numerical
results. 33 Nevertheless, the results have considerable value. First, my
sample is sufficiently representative to justify confidence in areas in
which I obtained a consensus from the broad range of individuals
whom I interviewed. Second, even in situations in which I obtained
evidence from one or only a few individuals, this evidence still has
great value as direct evidence of the perceptions of the individuals
who actually enter into the transactions the Article examines. Given a
choice between the untested predictions of abstract economic models
22 The anonymous office building developer.
23 Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc., Hewlett-Packard Company, Weingarten Realty Investors,

and the anonymous manufacturer.
24 Weingarten Realty Investors and the anonymous mall developer, anonymous office building
developer, and anonymous shopping center developer.
25 The anonymous pharmaceutical company.
26 Texas Pneumatic Tools, Inc.
27 Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. manufactures beer, Hewlett-Packard Company manufactures computers and related equipment, and the anonymous manufacturer produces a variety of
electronic and related products.
28 WSHS Enterprises, Inc.
29 I interviewed three different officers in the investment arm of American General Corporation: one who manages investments in private and public placements (Gordon S. Massie), one
who invests in privately and publicly traded real estate securities (Sonia W. Hanstra), and one
who supervises loan administration for a related entity (Jocelyn Sears).
30 The interview subjects make a wide variety of bank loans, including small-business loans
(Joe DeKunder), middle-market loans (the anonymous middle-market banker), construction loans
(Richmond W. Coburn), general commercial loans (Harry C. Mueller), and large corporate loans
(Clyde F. Wendel).
31 At Deutsche Financial Services Corporation, I spoke to the director of portfolio credit, who
supervises large transactions (James C. Meals), and also to the credit manager of the local St.
Louis region, who has responsibility for much smaller transactions (Richard Greco).
32 I spoke to a trade credit administrator at Eveready Battery Company, Inc. (R.O. Wirengard) and at Hewlett-Packard Company (Andrea I. Dunn).
33 I also recognize that any attempt to use interviews to evaluate complex environments is
subject to the problem that the interview subjects may not be able to explain the motivations for
their actions to the interviewer. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law
in Lawyers' Heads, go Nw. U. L. Rav. 1498, 1548 (1996) (suggesting that the "principal limitation" of interviews as a technique for evaluating strategies "is that real people may not have good
analyses of their own actions or, if they do, may not be very good at explaining them').
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and the experience of individuals who have real money at stake in the
lending market, the lessons of experience should prevail.
Working from the base of data gathered in those interviews, this
Article presents the most comprehensive explanation yet offered of the
factors that influence the pattern of secured credit. Most previous
work analyzing the reasons that parties choose secured credit has attempted to provide a unified theory for secured credit, using a single
consideration to explain all or most of the manifestations of secured
and unsecured credit.3 4 The empirical evidence presented in this Article casts grave doubt on most of the one-factor perspectives advocated
by previous commentators; it also suggests that no such perspective
can succeed. This Article argues that no single factor can capture the
multiple and interrelated considerations that motivate borrowers and
lenders as they structure their various transactions.
Starting from that multivariate perspective, Part I spells out the
assumptions on which the Article's analysis rests and sets out a
method of organizing the relevant considerations: a model of the borrower's decision to enter a lending transaction that is based on the
premise that the borrower will structure its borrowing to minimize the
joint costs of the borrower and the lender. Part II uses that decisionbased model to outline the reasons why borrowers might or might not
wish to secure their loan transactions, presenting a series of different
factors and developing the considerations that explain the puzzles discussed in Part III of the Article.
Because of the empirical underpinnings of this Article, Part II provides significantly more detail than previous scholarship about the
mechanisms by which secured credit can lower and raise the costs of
lending transactions. Specifically, section lI.A explains how a grant of
collateral can lower the parties' pre-loan assessment of the likelihood
of nonpayment by increasing the lender's ability to coerce payment if
the borrower does not pay voluntarily. Less directly, the collateral
also enhances the borrower's incentive to pay voluntarily and lessens
the differentiation of incentives between the borrower and the lender.
In addition to creating these benefits for the parties, however, granting
collateral also can impose costs. Section l-.B argues that granting collateral increases the costs of entering the transaction (especially for
publicly traded borrowers) as well as the costs that the parties incur
during the course of loan administration. The differing incentives of
the parties are the source of the administrative costs: a lender looks to
its borrowers for stability, not growth, and it is costly for borrowers to
34 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 7, at 89-95 (arguing that unsecured credit is used to provide
monitoring for dispersed equity investors); Scott, supra note 12, at 916-i9 (arguing that secured
credit is used to foster exclusive lending relationships); see also LoPucki, supra note 16, at 14-19
(suggesting that secured credit is used to render borrowers judgment proof).
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submit their decisionmaking to the supervision of a party not interested in maximizing the borrower's long-term profitability. The costs
of that supervision - costs that prior scholars have largely dismissed
or ignored - constitute a significant reason for parties to choose not
to use secured credit.
Finally, Part -I" applies the Article's decision-based model to three
common puzzles about the pattern of secured credit. First, Part ]IE
addresses the most well-documented fact about the pattern: the general absence of secured credit from the balance sheets of the most financially sound companies. Previous scholars have offered a variety of
theoretical explanations for that phenomenon. None of these theories,
however, satisfactorily explains the existing empirical evidence, which
indicates a significant amount of unsecured debt by small companies
as well as a strong pressure by the financial markets on large compa5
nies to use as much unsecured debt as possible.3
The second puzzle discussed in Part III is the relative ubiquity of
long-term debt. The empirical evidence on that question is mixed. On
the one hand, the evidence shows a significant connection between
term and collateral: long-term debt is more likely to involve collateral
than short-term debt. On the other hand, the pattern is not uniform:
significant types of long-term and short-term secured and unsecured
debt are easy to find. Prior scholars have provided little or no explanation of either the significant relation between term and collateral or
36
why the pattern suggested by that relation is not ubiquitous.
The last puzzle addressed in Part II is the use of collateral to secure inventory credit. In this context, prior scholars have struggled to
explain a phenomenon that does not exist. Contrary to the assumptions that have formed the basis for previous analyses, inventory suppliers often do retain security interests in the products that they sell.
Using empirical evidence to glimpse the actual pattern of inventory
credit, section ]II.C suggests factors that might inform an inventory
37
supplier's decision about retaining collateral.
I.

A

DECISION-BASED MODEL OF THE BORROWING DECISION

This Article relies on a combination of existing statistical studies
and relatively unstructured interviews. Because of the repetitive nature of the interviews, a narrative description of their substance would
be neither an appropriate vehicle for explaining the evidence produced
by the interviews nor a useful analytical tool for understanding how
borrowers and lenders make decisions. I therefore present my findings
about these credit decisions within a framework 3S See infra section III.A.
36 See infra section "II.B.
37 See infra section I'.C.

a model -

that
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provides a structure for organizing, understanding, and applying the

evidence. This Part of the Article explains that model and the assumptions on which it rests.

The purpose of this project is to analyze the pattern of decisions
about secured credit. Hence, the model focuses on the factors that influence borrowing decisions. Specifically, the model approaches the
complex of decisions about secured debt from the perspective of a
business enterprise that has determined that it wishes to borrow a
specified sum of money.38 This Article assumes that the borrower will

grant collateral to secure the loan only if the borrower believes that
the net benefits of the most favorable secured transaction will be
greater than or equal to the net benefits of the most favorable unsecured transaction.3 9 References to "net" benefits reflect a subsidiary
assumption that the borrower attempts to minimize the costs incurred
by both of the parties to the loan transaction. This assumption is
designed to ensure that the analysis takes account of two important
categories of costs.
First, this Article assumes that the borrower considers factors that
increase the expenses of the lender. This assumption relies on the
premise that the market for business lending is relatively efficient. In
other words, the market allows the lender to include in its charges
amounts sufficient to compensate it for the costs that it expects to incur in the transaction, either by assessing separate fees or by altering
the nominal interest rate. 40 The Article assumes that the market
38 This Article focuses on business lending because that is the context in which the secured
credit debate has taken place. The Article's methodology also could be applied directly to the
consumer context. The principal difficulty would be accounting for the smaller probability that
consumer borrowers understand and respond rationally to all of the various costs that they are
likely to face over the course of a lending transaction. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Contract Law and
Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 303, 324 (1983) (summarizing empirical evidence
indicating that consumers do not act in accordance with neoclassical assumptions about wealth
maximization). See generally RicHARD H. THALER, QuAsi RATIONAL EcONOMICS (iggi) (collecting empirical studies that document the ways in which individual choices depart from the predictions of utility-maximizing economic theories).
39 The hypothetical assumes that the borrower already has determined that it does not wish
to acquire the funds through equity investment. This Article does not undertake to evaluate the
considerations that influence the decision to obtain capital through borrowing rather than through
equity investment For an ambitious attempt to integrate the effects of debt and equity on corporate governance, see George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive
Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. Rxv. 1073 (1995).
40 Lenders certainly attempt to set fees in this way. For example, a lending officer in the
metropolitan corporate lending group of a large St. Louis bank explained how he attempted to
recover the costs of time spent by the bank's loan audit group in evaluating a potential
transaction:
Sometimes we can charge out [our employee's] hours but sometimes the borrower says
screw you I'm not going to pay that. So then maybe I say well instead of 200 [basis
points] over LIBOR [the London Interbank Offer Rate] it's 225 in the first year, stepping
down to 200 - well, I get you coming or I get you going.
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works sufficiently well to induce the borrower and the lender to select
41

the transaction that they believe will have the lowest joint costs.
Second, this Article assumes, at least as a starting point, that the

borrower will act with sufficient rationality at the beginning of the
lending transaction to consider the indirect costs that it will incur
throughout the transaction. "Indirect" costs are costs that the borrower incurs during the transaction that are not included in the interest rate or the fees specified in the loan documents. As discussed
below, lending transactions can impose a variety of costs that are not
covered by the express payment terms or listed on the closing statement. These costs generally arise from the grant to the lender of the
capacity to prevent the borrower from operating its business in the
most profitable manner.4 2 Borrowers may not account for those costs
perfectly, 43 but because this Article focuses on the relatively sophisticated parties involved in business lending, the assumption that the

borrowers in question at least roughly account for such costs in their
44

borrowing decisions is a reasonable one.
A converse point bears emphasis: this Article assumes that the borrower does not consider costs imposed on entities that do not participate directly in the transaction. Thus, to mention the most important
example, the model assumes that the borrower does not consider the
costs that the decision to secure a debt may impose on other creditors
whose prospects for repayment are harmed more by a secured transaction than by an unsecured transaction, except to the extent that those
Interview with Clyde F. Wendel, Senior Vice President, The Boatmen's National Bank of St.
Louis, in St. Louis, Mo. (July 21, 1995) [hereinafter Wendel Interview] (transcript at 16, on file
with the Harvard Law School Library). For an explanation of the reference to "basis points," see
note 136 below.
41 This approach is common in the literature (although it often is couched as a statement of
fact rather than as an assumption). See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 5, at 1152 ("Both
parties will have an incentive to arrange their transaction in a way that minimizes the sum of [all
of the costs that the parties incur], since they can share any savings between them.'),
42 See infra section II.B.2.
43 See, e.g., Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and
Institutions, 47 KvKLos 3, 5-13 (r994) (analyzing reasons why the actual choices of individuals
do not reflect the substantive rationality that is the basic assumption of neoclassical economics);
see also infra p. 673 (discussing the relative ability of different borrowers to evaluate the costs of
loan transactions).
44 The interviews discussed in this Article provide support for that point as well. See, e.g.,
Telephone Interview with Joseph W. Robertson, Jr., Chief Financial Officer, Weingarten Realty
Investors (July 11, 1995) [hereinafter Robertson Interview] (transcript at 2, 10, 18, 21, on file with
the Harvard Law School Library) (citing loss of flexibility as a reason to avoid issuing secured
loans). This Article does not suggest that borrowers always act rationally; it does, however, offer
an explanation for why rational, creditworthy borrowers frequently would choose not to secure
debts. The possibility remains that borrowers choose not to secure debts for other reasons that
are not captured by rational-actor analysis. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1930 (arguing that
corporate managers issue unsecured debt for personal reasons inimical to the interests of the borrowing corporation). But see infra p. 67r (rejecting LoPucki's argument).
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creditors will be able to react to the grant of collateral by imposing

higher interest costs on the borrower. 45 Hence, because this Article
does not consider all of the economic costs of the decision to secure a

loan, the analysis does not prove that secured lending is (or is not) a
good thing for the economy as a whole. 4 6 The Article attempts to explain the pattern of secured lending as it actually occurs in the economy, not to evaluate the efficiency or propriety of secured credit in the
abstract.

A final point about the model relates to timing. Because this Article aims to explain why borrowers secure their debts, it focuses on the
costs that the parties perceive at the time that they enter the transaction, not the costs that the parties actually incur during the course of
the disbursement and repayment of funds. Borrowers and lenders cannot negotiate loan terms that impose costs based on the actual losses
that will arise during the transaction; they must negotiate loan terms
based on estimates of future events (relying, of course, on the costs
actually incurred in previous transactions). And because the loan
terms on which the parties agree determine the borrower's choice beperception of the
tween secured and unsecured debt, the 4"pre-loan"
7
costs of nonpayment is the relevant one.
45 Prior scholars have made much of the effect of future borrowing costs on a borrower. See,
e.g., LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1896-1902. Although a full rebuttal of that position is far beyond
the scope of this Article, the effect does not seem to explain much of the pattern of secured credit.
This Article's analysis identifies real cost savings from secured credit that go far beyond a simple
externalization of risk to future creditors who would charge for the risk if they could. If this cost
savings theory is correct, secured credit has the potential to reduce the borrower's overall borrowing costs, not just the costs of the particular transaction in which credit is secured.
Having said that, I acknowledge that secured credit reduces the private costs of borrowing in
the frequent situations in which the other creditors have no realistic opportunity to pass those
costs on to the borrower (for example, when the other creditor is the victim of a tort committed
by the borrower). See Ronald J. Mann, The First Shall Be Last: A Contextual Argument for
Abandoning Temporal Rules of Lien Priority, 75 TEX. L. REv. II, 21-23 (1996). Those purely
private savings, however, provide no justification for secured credit. Thus, the legal system
should act where feasible to reverse that externalization. See id. at 25-31 (arguing that reversal
of lien priority in the construction loan context enhances efficiency by preventing externalization
of risk to nonadjusting contractors).
46 Tom Jackson and Tony Kronman offer the classic statement of the problem: "At first blush,
it may seem unfair that a debtor should be allowed to make a private contract with one creditor
that demotes the claims of other creditors from an initial position of parity to one of subordination." Jackson & Kronman, supra note 5, at 1147; see also LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1899 ('Security is an agreement between A and B that C take nothing."). Because this Article's main
objective is empirical, I do not consider the normative question of which rights the law should
give to secured creditors. This is not to say that normative argument cannot be supported by
empirical analysis. See Mann, supra note 45, at 44-67 (presenting empirical evidence about the
construction industry to support the normative argument that a construction lender should not
have priority over contractors that work on a construction project even if the construction lender
receives a prior lien on the project).
47 The more common terminology would refer to parties' "ex ante" perception of the costs.
See, e.g., Kham & Nate's Shoes Number 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, r358 ( 7th Cir.
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THE BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF SECURED CREDIT

Benefits: Why Would a Borrower Ever Secure Its Debt?

The first step in analyzing how a borrower decides whether to secure a particular debt is to ask why a borrower ever would secure any
of its debt.48 After all, a borrower receives no direct benefit from an
arrangement that enhances a lender's ability to force the borrower to
repay a loan. My answer is simple: the advantages that a lender receives from a grant of collateral can lower the lender's anticipated
overall costs and thus indirectly lower the costs that the borrower
must pay to induce the lender to make the loan.4 9 Although this answer may seem obvious, this Article's willingness to embrace the multiple factors that affect commercial lending decisions and its focus on
the mechanisms by which secured credit can facilitate those transactions represent a significant advance over prior work. This Article
distinguishes two general groups of advantages for the lender: the
lender's direct legal rights to force repayment by taking the collateral,
and the less direct advantages that operate before the lender tries to
199o) (opinion of Easterbrook, J.). Reference to the parties' "pre-loan" perception of the costs
seems clearer.
48 The concepts of "security" and "collateral" are admittedly arbitrary, and parties surely can
obtain many of the benefits associated with secured transactions through arrangements that are
not technically "secured." See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1921-23 (explaining how each of the
legal benefits attributable to secured credit can be obtained in unsecured transactions); Scott,
supra note 12, at 912 (criticizing "the implicit assumption that security is a meaningful generic
concept"). Notwithstanding the arbitrariness of defining the boundaries of "secured credit," the
concept has sufficient content to serve as a tool for inquiry.
b be sure, a complete description of the pattern of secured credit would take into account the
availability of alternate transactions that effectively provide the benefits of a secured transaction
even though they are technically not secured. See, e.g., Robertson Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 13-14) (describing the functional similarity between nonrecourse secured financing and
asset securitization through special-purpose entities). This omission from my analysis is not, however, a serious problem. At least in the short run, the novelty of unconventional transactions less predictable in effect and more difficult to understand - substantially undermines their general attractiveness to prospective borrowers and lenders.
49 Some scholars have offered explanations of secured credit that do not rest on its ability to
lower the costs of the specific loans in which it occurs, but rather on more general effects on the
borrower's overall credit structure. The most well delineated of those explanations is Saul
Levmore's model, which attributes much of the benefit of secured credit to the posited lower costs
of the borrower's unsecured borrowings. Levmore argues that secured credit lowers a borrower's
overall borrowing costs through focusing the incentive to monitor a borrower's activities in a
single creditor and rewarding that creditor for its monitoring efforts by granting it a priority
recovery. See Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92
YALE LJ. 49, 53-59 (1982). As Paul Shupack has explained, however, "it is not at all obvious
how the general [unsecured] creditors are helped by monitors whose advantage lies in the collateral rather than in the debtor." Paul M. Shupack, Defending PurchaseMoney Security Interests
Under Article 9 of the U.C.C. from Professor Buckley, 22 IND. L. REv. 777, 782 n.16 (z989); see
Jackson & Kronman, supra note 5, at 1154 n.44 (arguing that later creditors will not be able to
free ride on policing by earlier creditors); see also Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle, supra note 9,
at io55-59 (criticizing Levmore's argument from a more abstract perspective).
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obtain payment forcibly. The direct legal advantages increase the like-

lihood that the lender can forcibly collect on default. The indirect advantages not only give the borrower a powerful incentive to repay by

enhancing the consequences of nonpayment, but also substantially offset the separation of interests inherent in lending transactions. If the

lender understands these effects when it makes the loan, the advantages lower the lender's pre-loan estimate of the likelihood of nonpayment and ultimately lower the anticipated aggregate costs of the
transaction. Hence, the advantages of security can lead the lender to
ease the terms of the transaction.

i. Direct Advantages: Enforcing Payment. - The most obvious
advantage to the lender of issuing secured credit is that receiving collateral increases the likelihood that the lender will be able to collect
the loan forcibly if the borrower does not voluntarily repay it.so As
Lynn LoPucki has explained, the law of secured credit (whether Article 9 or the less standardized principles regarding mortgages) 5 ' enhances the lender's ability to enforce payment in at least three
separate ways: by encumbering collateral (so that the lender has a permanent interest in an identifiable asset or group of assets); by granting
priority (so that the lender will be paid before other creditors); and by
enhancing the lender's remedy (so that the lender can coerce payment
more quickly than it could if its debt were not secured).5 2 If the
lender believes when it makes the loan that these advantages increase
the likelihood of repayment, the lender can charge less for the loan,
thus lowering the aggregate costs of the transaction."
2.

Indirect Advantages: Before Collection. -

As Bob Scott noted

more than a decade ago, the enhancement of the lender's ability to
SOSee, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 5, at 7 (asserting that security benefits borrowers "largely by
allowing the secured party to take the property subject to its security interest and sell it to reduce
or eliminate the debt").
S One of the methodological goals of this Article is to start to remedy the separation of scholarship regarding loans secured by personal property (typically referred to as secured credit) from
scholarship regarding loans secured by real property (typically referred to as mortgages). Lynn
LoPucki and Elizabeth Warren recently published a pioneering attempt to integrate the study of
the real-property security system with the study of the personal-property security system. See
LYNN M. LoPucmi & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH (i995).
For an older effort to integrate analysis of those systems, see GEORGE E. OSBORNE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PROPERTY SECURITY (2d ed. 1954).
52 See LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1921-23 (stating that the doctrinal concept of security consists of these three attributes).
S3 In some cases, the net benefit from enhancing the lender's ability to enforce collection will
be offset by an increase in the borrower's costs of borrowing in other transactions. Borrowing
costs rise because informed unsecured creditors will charge more for their loans if previous encumbrances make their loans inordinately risky. See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 5, at
1153-54; Schwartz, supra note 5, at 7-9. In all likelihood, however, some creditors will not be
able to react. See supra note 45.
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collect the loan forcibly is not the only advantages 4 - or even, in
many cases, the leading advantage5 5 - that motivates parties to secure debt. Subsequent scholars, however, have done little to explain
exactly what the indirect advantages of secured lending are and how
they work. The evidence presented in this Article suggests that the
direct advantages discussed above carry with them a number of practical advantages that have significance before the lender attempts to
obtain repayment forcibly through the legal system.5 6 Specifically, the
S4 See Scott, supra note 12, at g5o. Scott notes:
[T]he function of secured credit is conceived within the industry as enabling the creditor to
influence debtor actions prior to the onset of business failure. This conception is markedly
different in effect from the traditional vision of collateral as a residual asset claim upon
default and insolvency. Security is taken for its active rather than its passive properties.
Id.; see also Interview with Richmond W. Coburn, Vice President, The Boatmen's National Bank
of St. Louis, in St. Louis, Mo. (July 6, iggS) [hereinafter Coburn Interview] (transcript at 4, on file
with the Harvard Law School Library) C' ]e never want to rely upon the liquidation of that
asset for repayment .... ."); Interview with Treasurer of Anonymous Manufacturer (Jan. 9, 1996)
[hereinafter Manufacturer Treasurer Interview] (transcript at 7, on file with the Harvard Law
School Library) ("[Tihe lender almost invariably doesn't ever want to become the owner of that
asset.").
Scott's point is easy to overstate. There are contexts - such as the heavily asset-based lending that dominates the real-estate lending sector - in which the parties view the ability to enforce collection out of the collateral as the most important reason for taking security. For
example, in an interview with the division manager overseeing the real estate group of a $z6
billion bank holding company, I asked the subject what he personally thought was "the most
important benefit that the lender gets out of taking collateral." He stated without hesitation that
"a lot of times the bottom line is you've got your money out of the collateral." Interview with
Harry C. Mueller, Senior Vice President, Mercantile Bank of St. Louis, N.A., in St. Louis, Mo.
(July io, 1995) [hereinafter Mueller Interview] (transcript at 2, on file with the Harvard Law
School Library). Lenders outside the real estate area made similar comments. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Gordon S. Massie, Portfolio Manager, American General Corporation (July
14, igg5) [hereinafter Massie Interview] (transcript at 2, on file with the Harvard Law School
Library) (stating, based on his experience as the manager of a $goo million securities portfolio for
a life insurance company, that the ability to obtain payment out of the collateral is the most
important benefit of taking collateral).
SS One reason why lenders would be imprudent to rely predominantly on their ability to obtain forcible repayment through liquidation of the collateral is that they are generally unable to
recover the indirect costs that they incur when monitoring a problem loan. Lenders also face a
strong likelihood that liquidation of the collateral will not even result in full repayment of their
principal and interest. A standard lending text for bankers offers a particularly poignant example
in its discussion of the difficulties of a Dutch bank that loaned money to a fur company. When
the bank attempted to recover its loan out of live beavers that had been pledged as collateral,
animal rights activists prevented the slaughter of the beavers. Eventually, the bank paid to have
the beavers shipped to Uruguay, where they were released. See GEORGE E. RUTH, COMMERCIAL
LENDING 250-5

(2d ed. iggo). For an empirical analysis of the problems that lenders face in

attempting to recover loans by forcible liquidation, see Ronald J. Mann, Liquidating the Collateral of Distressed Debtors: A Case Study 11-14 (Oct. 28, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Harvard Law School Library).
S6 The idea that indirect advantages can constrain conduct without recourse to the legal system is neither novel nor unique to the secured credit situation. For the seminal work on this idea,
see Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc.
REv. 55 (1963). David Charny, Robert Ellickson, and Eric Posner have written the most impor-
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grant of collateral can enhance the lender's ability to limit subsequent

borrowings, increase the borrower's incentive to attempt to repay the
loan voluntarily, and facilitate restraints on the borrower's incentive to
57
engage in risky conduct.

(a)

Limiting Subsequent Borrowings.

-

Although never identi-

fied in prior scholarship, one of the simplest and most significant advantages of secured credit in practice is that it enhances the lender's

ability to limit subsequent borrowings.5 8 Lenders in particular circumstances may want to limit subsequent borrowings for various rea-

sons,5 9 but the most general reason is the belief that the borrower will
pay more attention to its business if the borrower has a more substan-

tant recent explications of this idea. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARv. L. REV. 373, 39r-4o8 (iggo) (offering a tripartite typology of nonlegal
sanctions and explaining the circumstances in which they are more effective than legal sanctions);
Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control, i6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 67, 71-90 (1987) (offering a taxonomy of five different types of rules to control
behavior and criticizing the "legal-centralist tradition," which ignores the importance of the four
types of nonlegal rules); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. Cm. L. REv. 133, x44-65 (1996) (discussing the
relation between the nonlegal sanctions available to private groups and the legal sanctions imposed by the state). This Article is the first sustained attempt to consider the nature of these
indirect advantages in the context of secured lending.
s7 Randy Picker has offered a somewhat different, although overlapping, articulation of five
different roles that security interests can play. See Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CH. L. REv. 645, 650-53 (1992). The principal difference
between Picker's discussion and the present analysis is that this Article relies on empirical evidence, focuses on leverage, and emphasizes the mechanisms through which security interests affect
transactions. Picker does not present any significant empirical evidence to support his analysis
and does not discuss either leverage or the practical mechanisms by which secured credit operates.
58 See, e.g., FRANK P. JOHNSON & RicHARDiD. JOHNSON, BANK MANAGEMENT 160 (1983)
(American Bankers Association textbook) (stating that "[flor most secured commercial loans, the
purpose of collateral is to provide a source of repayment in case of default and to limit the
borrower's capacity to borrow from other sources" (emphasis added)); Interview with Joe
DeKunder, Vice President, NationsBank of Texas, NA., in St. Louis, Mo. (June 13, 1995) [hereinafter DeKunder Interview] (transcript at 3, on file with the Harvard Law School Library) ("[W]e
want to assure ourselves that the [borrower] in a worst-case scenario . . . will not go out and
pledge the collateral somewhere else."); see also Interview with Anonymous Office Building Developer (July 13, 1995) [hereinafter Office Building Developer Interview] (transcript at 7-8, on file
with the Harvard Law School Library) (stating that his company would find no practical difference between a mortgage and an enforceable agreement barring him from granting a subsequent
lien). I am in the midst of an empirical research project about small-business lending, which
suggests that the desire to limit future borrowings is particularly important in that context.
59 Bob Scott, for example, believes that lenders want to limit subsequent borrowings only as a
way to ensure priority. See Scott, supra note i, at 945. Because he does not consider the effects
of future debt on the borrower's incentive to attend to its business, he does not see any separate
benefit in secured credit's capacity to limit subsequent borrowing. See id. Another rationale was
offered by a banker who stated that he likes to prevent subsequent borrowing to avoid the strategic difficulty of having another adverse party to deal with in the event that the borrower becomes
distressed. See Mueller Interview, supra note 54 (transcript at 13-14).
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tial stake in the business - more to gain and more to lose. 60 By limiting the borrower's ability to obtain large loans in the future, the
lender limits the borrower's ability to decrease its interest in the business, as long as the lender also can limit the borrower's ability to sell
61
its ownership interest in the business.
Although the legal rights that constitute a grant of collateral do not
directly bar subsequent borrowings, a grant of collateral can limit the
borrower's ability to obtain future loans by reducing its ability to
grant a valuable security interest to subsequent lenders.6 2 That limita60 See, e.g., i GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WI-nmAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 5.21,
at 297-98 (Practitioner Treatise Series 3d ed. 1994) (explaining that restrictions on subsequent
encumbrances are "utilized mainly to protect against impairment of mortgage security by a debtor
who incurs a junior mortgage debt and thus reduces his or her economic stake in the mortgaged
real estate"); Robertson Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 22) (statement of Chief Financial
Officer of NYSE real estate company) ("[Lenders bar subordinate liens b]ecause they want the
borrower to have equity in the project. They do not want the borrower gutting [the project] taking all the money out via subordinate loans - so that he cannot walk away.). This idea
exemplifies the well-recognized general point that managers of businesses have a greater incentive
to operate their businesses profitably when they have more to lose upon failure of the business.
This point is distinguishable from the related observation that debt can affect the borrower's
appetite for risk. The problem for the lender here is not so much that the leverage caused by
debt tends to make the borrower operate the business more riskily, but that the absence of equity
tends to lessen the borrower's incentive to attend to the business at all. See Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. Fn'. ECON. 305, 313 (,976) (distinguishing between enhanced incentive for risktaking and diminished incentive for managerial effort and suggesting that the diminution in effort
is the more significant of the two problems).
61 Interviews with lenders suggest that secured lenders are able to bar transfers of the borrower's ownership. See Coburn Interview, supra note 54 (transcript at 19-20) (describing loan
restrictions on the sale of equity interest in strip shopping centers given as collateral); DeKunder
Interview, supra note 58 (transcript at 22-23) (describing restrictions in secured and unsecured
small-business loans on transfer by borrower of an interest in its business); Mueller Interview,
supra note 54 (transcript at 12) (describing restrictions on change of ownership of borrowers in
real-estate loans generally); see also RIcHARD BROOK, DEBT COVENANTS AND EVENT RISK: THE
PRACTITIONER AS A SOURCE OF EVIDENCE 19 (Center for Law and Econ. Studies, Columbia
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 51, 19go) (reporting that interviews with bond practitioners indicate that covenants in publicly traded unsecured debt frequently prohibit sale-leaseback
transactions and mergers).
Many of the documents provided by the interview subjects also support this proposition. See,
e.g., NationsBank of Texas, N.A., Deed of Trust, Assignment and Security Agreement § ig [hereinafter NationsBank Mortgage] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (commercial real
estate mortgage) (authorizing lender to accelerate the date of maturity if the borrower transfers
any part of the collateral or any beneficial interest in the borrowing entity); NationsBank of
Texas, N.A., Security Agreement
E.2 & G.I.d [hereinafter NationsBank Small-Business Security Agreement] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (security agreement for small-business loans) (requiring a warranty that the borrower owns the collateral and defining the event of
default to include "substantial change in any fact warranted" in the agreement).
62 In most cases, any subsequent security interest would be subordinate to the existing security interest. Thus, the subsequent interest would be considerably less valuable, both because it
would be subordinated to the debt secured by the previous security interest and because of the
relatively unfavorable strategic position of a subordinate secured creditor.
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643.

tion, in turn, may make future borrowings relatively expensive (and
thus less attractive) for the borrower.
Of course, a borrower does not need to grant a lien to promise to
refrain from subsequent borrowings; the borrower can make a negative covenant or negative pledge. For several reasons, however, those
promises have quite a limited practical effect, especially when the borrower is a small company. The first problem with a negative covenant is that a court is unlikely to treat a debt (or lien) issued in
violation of such a covenant as void. 63 Hence, a subsequent lender
that takes such a debt or lien may not be significantly hindered by the
violation of the prior covenant, especially if the subsequent lender is
not aware of the prior covenant when it makes its loan.
That problem would not be serious if the negative covenant lender
could be sure that it quickly would discover covenant violations. If
the lender learns of the default quickly enough to force the borrower
into bankruptcy within ninety days of the violation of the covenant,
64
the lender may be able to avoid the debt or lien as a preference.
Unfortunately for the negative covenant lender, learning of the default
in time to take action is often quite difficult, especially if the borrower
is a small company. For many lenders, conducting routine U.C.C.
searches of all of the borrowers in their portfolios is too expensive to
be a practical option.65 Nor is it always practical for lenders to rely
on credit services such as Dun & Bradstreet to learn of covenant violations by their borrowers. Some scholars have assumed that reports
available from Dun & Bradstreet and similar companies provide an
inexpensive and effective way for lenders to monitor the activities of
their borrowers. 66 The lenders who addressed this assumption in the
interviews for this Article, however, uniformly agreed that these reports cannot protect them against subsequent loans that violate their

63 See, e.g., i NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6o, § 3.38, at 12o-24 (discussing the limited
enforceability of negative pledge covenants in the real estate context); LoPucki, supra note 8, at
1926 & n.xi (discussing problems with the judicial enforcement of negative pledge covenants).
64 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (i994); LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1926-27.
65 See, e.g., Wendel Interview, supra note 40 (transcript at 6) (statement of corporate lending
officer for bank) C'W]e don't normally do a U.C.C. search other than when we are entering into a
new relationship . .. or when we have a troubled situation .. .or if we are in the process of
taking collateral."); Telephone Interview with R.O. Wirengard, Director of Credit, Eveready Battery Company, Inc. (July 13, 1995) [hereinafter Wirengard Interview] (transcript at 5-6, on file
with the Harvard Law School Library) (stating that his company does not routinely do U.C.C.
searches).
66 See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1943 & n.2xo (asserting that creditors can "monitor[ ]
the vital signs of the debtor's business from a Dun & Bradstreet report" and citing other scholars
who have made similar assertions); id. at 1936 ("[Sophisticated trade creditors] extend short-term
credit and monitor U.C.C. filings through credit reports to discover the grant of security when it
comes.").
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loan documents, either because the information is not sufficiently accu67
rate or because it is untimely.
These problems are considerably less significant with respect to
public companies because of the difficulty that these companies will
face if they try to issue debt or liens without the subsequent lender
discovering the existence of prohibitive covenants in prior debt instruments.68 The most obvious reason for this difficulty is the level of
examination of the borrower's affairs that is characteristic of the large
transactions in which such companies engage. A typical lender receives not only representations and warranties from the borrowing entity, but also assurances from the borrower's counsel that the
transaction does not violate the terms of any previous loans to the
borrower.6 9 A second reason is the need of these companies to return
so frequently to the public debt markets. If a large company dependent on the public debt market issues debt in violation of a covenant
in a prior loan, public revelation of that violation is likely to seriously
disrupt the company's efforts to maintain the credit relationships necessary to operate its business.7 0 Accordingly, these companies can give
a commitment to refrain from violating covenants limiting the issuance

67 See Interview with Richard Greco, Regional Manager of Deutsche Financial Services Corporation, in Des Peres, Mo. (July 18, x995) [hereinafter Greco Interview] (transcript at 16-17, on
file with the Harvard Law School Library) (describing the inadequacies of Dun & Bradstreet
reports and focusing on the untimeliness of information and inaccurate reports of U.C.C. filings);
Wendel Interview, supra note 40 (transcript at 6) (statement of bank loan officer) (explaining that
he does not rely on Dun & Bradstreet reports to monitor troubled debtors because "I haven't
found Dun & Bradstreet to be a particularly accurate report"); Wirengard Interview, supra note
65 (transcript at 5) (statement of trade creditor) (describing the inadequacies of Dun & Bradstreet
data and focusing on untimeliness and cost of information); see also Telephone Interview with
Andrea J. Dunn, Worldwide Credit Manager, Corporate Treasury, Hewlett-Packard Company
(Jan. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Dunn Interview] (transcript at 6, on file with the Harvard Law School
Library) (stating that monitoring of her customers' credit generally is limited to "periodic review");
Interview with William J. Kimmins, Jr., Treasurer, Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc., in St. Louis,
Mo. (Oct. 26, '995) [hereinafter Kimmins Interview] (transcript at i5, on file with the Harvard
Law School Library) (discussing the trade-credit practices of a Fortune Zoo manufacturing company, which include a policy of reviewing credit reports only annually).
68 See Wendel Interview, supfa note 40 (transcript at 22-23) (statement of bank officer who
lends only to large companies) (stating that he doubts that his borrowers could successfully borrow money in the face of a negative pledge covenant).
69 See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1926-27.
70 See Telephone Interview with Sonia W. Hamstra, Director, Real Estate Investments, American General Corporation (Aug. 2, r995) [hereinafter Hamstra Interview] (transcript at 5, on file
with the Harvard Law School Library) (statement by life insurance company investment officer)
(explaining that the credit markets would be likely to react negatively to any action by an issuer
of public debt that was inconsistent with the borrower's previous representations about its future
financing plans); LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1927-28 (discussing an interview with a New York
attorney who made a similar point).
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of further debt and liens that is more credible than anything that a
71
small company can offer.
In sum, a grant of collateral provides a practical way to enhance
the enforceability of covenants against future debt and liens, especially
for entities that lend to smaller borrowers for whom there is no practical means of monitoring compliance with such a covenant. When a
grant of collateral significantly lowers the likelihood that the borrower
will obtain future borrowings, the lien aids the parties by lowering the
lender's pre-loan perception of the risk that excessive future borrowing
might lead to default.
(b) Enhancing the Borrower's Incentive to Pay. - The second
way in which a grant of collateral can provide indirect pre-enforcement advantages is by giving the lender leverage that increases the
borrower's incentive to repay the loan. 72 There is nothing new about

the idea that the lender has considerable leverage over the borrower
based on the borrower's desire to avoid the loss that it would suffer if
the lender exercised its legal remedies. 73 But no one has identified
anything about secured credit in particular that enhances the lender's
leverage over the borrower.
71 Existing empirical evidence provides some support for this analysis because it suggests that
negative pledge covenants are quite common in publicly traded debt. See, e.g., Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,
xo5 YALE L.J. 857, 921-23 (I996) (citing empirical studies); BROOK, supra note 6i, at I9-2o (discussing information gathered from several practitioners). One of my interviews suggested a similax pattern. See Wendel Interview, supra note 40 (transcript at 21). Direct restrictions on
subsequent debt do appear, however, to be considerably less common in publicly traded debt.

See BROOK, supra note 61, at I9-2o. My interviews also suggest that lenders are becoming increasingly aware of the potential for enhancing the value of such covenants by fine tuning them
to particular situations. Specifically, large companies have a growing tendency to grant a limited
type of negative pledge that does not bar all
future liens, but instead requires the borrower to
retain a specified dollar amount (usually in the range of I5O% of the maximum loan amount) of
unencumbered assets. See Hainstra Interview, supra note 70 (transcript at 4) (stating that some
senior unsecured debt instruments issued by a publicly traded real estate investment trust require
the borrower to maintain a base of unencumbered assets equal to "something like i-r/2 to 2 times
whatever your unsecured debt is"); Manufacturer Treasurer Interview, supra note 54 (transcript at
5)(describing a negative pledge that allows the borrower to grant subsequent liens as long as a
specified amount of assets remains unencumbered); Robertson Interview, supra note 44 (transcript
at iI)(statement of a borrower) (describing a revolving credit facility that requires the borrower
to maintain a pool of unencumbered assets equal to i5o% of the total amount of credit authorized
under the facility).
72 Unlike the ability of secured credit to limit subsequent borrowing, the advantage discussed
here is closely related to the substance of the legal rights included in a grant of collateral. To use
the common metaphor, the parties here are reacting to the "shadow" of the law - the parties'
anticipation of what would happen if formal legal proceedings were to occur. The seminal discussion of that phenomenon appears in Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 966-77 (,979).
73 See, e.g., LoPuciu & WARsN, supra note 5I, at 43; David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 8o VA. L. REv. 2179, 2188-89 (1994); Scott, supra note 12, at 926-27.
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The leverage of the secured creditor depends on the loss that the
secured creditor can inflict on the borrower by enforcing its legal remedies against the borrower. This loss is the difference between two
amounts: the loss that the debtor suffers when the secured creditor
exercises its remedies (the decrease .in value of the borrower's enterprise that would result from the repossession and loss of the collateral
in a foreclosure), and the offsetting benefit to the debtor (the reduction
of the debt that results from the liquidation of the collateral). Under
normal circumstances, because there is a large spread between these
two figures, foreclosure gives the lender the ability to inflict a considerable loss on the borrower. 74 The leverage arises from the one-sided
nature of the transaction: the borrower "gives" something that is worth
more (often considerably more) than what the lender receives. 7 5 The
borrower's desire to avoid this loss provides an added incentive to re76
pay the loan voluntarily.
74 A spread will exist whenever a borrower lacks a ready source of capital that enables the
borrower to place a bid for the asset that equals the value of the asset to the borrower's enterprise. Thus, as Jim Bowers pointed out to me, the lender would not be able to inflict a loss on
the borrower if the market for refinancing functioned perfectly and at no cost. Given the liquidity problems associated with defaulting borrowers, however, I assume that borrowers frequently
do not have such a source of capital. See Buckley, supra note 12, at 1434 n.78 (noting the
"screening costs involved in obtaining new credit in the brief time permitted, particularly after the
negative recommendation of the first lender's [action]"). But cf. Mann, supra note S5 (manuscript
at 7) (presenting empirical evidence suggesting that refinancing frequently is available to troubled
borrowers). On the other hand, as Bob Rasmussen pointed out to me in comments on a draft of
this Article, the bankruptcy system mitigates some aspects of the leverage by limiting the creditor's ability to take collateral that has a fair-market value in excess of the debt. See ii U.S.C.
§ 363(d) (1994) (barring relief from the automatic stay in most cases in which the debtor has
equity in the collateral, as long as the creditor's interest in the collateral is adequately protected);
see also Schwartz, Theory, supra note 9, at 243-44 (arguing that the availability of bankruptcy
limits secured creditors' procedural advantages over unsecured creditors).
75 The locus classicus for discussion of that phenomenon is a 1983 article by Oliver E. Williamson. See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange,
73 AM. EcoN. REV. 519, 537 (1983) (explaining how "hostages" can overcome problems in bilateral contracting); see also Tflantis, supra note ii, at 246-47 (applying that analysis in the context
of secured credit). For a horrific example (which may seem all too realistic to attorneys who
customarily represent borrowers), consider a security interest entitling the creditor to take a pound
of flesh upon default Cf. WiLLiAM SHAKESPEARE, The Merchant of Venice, in THE COMPLETE
WORKS, act i, sc. 3, ]]. 139-66 (Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor eds., compact ed., Oxford Univ.
Press x988) (involving not a security interest, but rather a penalty for failure to perform under a
bond). Perhaps a security interest would not have been subject to the difficulties about judicial
enforcement that undermined the deterrent effect of the bond. See id. act 4, sc. I.
76 See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS: TExT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 4-6 (3d ed. 1996). As a number of borrowers explained, the lender does not always have this leverage. Sometimes the lender will not be able to
liquidate the collateral for a value equal to the discounted cash flow, which is the amount that
the lender would receive if it left the property in the control of the borrower. In those circumstances, the lender's practical control over the borrower can become relatively weak. See, e.g.,
Office Building Developer Interview, supra note 58 (transcript at 9) (explaining that some cases of
default by his company "had been a strategic course of action to reach a default in an effort to
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To put the point more concretely, consider a borrower that secures
a loan of $120,000 with a lien on a drill press in the borrower's fac-

tory. 77 Assume that the drill press has a current fair-market value of
$120,000, that liquidation pursuant to the security agreement would
bring a net recovery of only $i00,000,78 and that loss of the drill 7press
9
would diminish the value of the borrower's business by $400,000. In
that case, the borrower would suffer a loss of $300,000 upon foreclosure and sale of the drill press.80 The lender's ability to inflict this
loss substantially raises the stakes of default for the borrower: the loss
is not just the "ordinary" loss from liquidating an asset at a distressed
sale rather than for fair-market value, but also the loss of all of the
idiosyncratic and synergistic values that the asset has for the
borrower. 8 '
The borrower's voluntary decision to repay the loan protects the
lender from the vagaries of the liquidation process, and saves the
lender the time and hassle (both of which are ultimately reducible to
money) of pursuing the borrower and the collateral. As the prospect
of that leverage increases the lender's pre-loan perception of the likeli-

renegotiate terms"); Pharmaceutical Company Interview, supra note 20 (transcript at 4) (describing
a situation in which a bank lender had little or no leverage because the bank could not lawfully
sell the FDA-regulated collateral pledged by the borrower); see also LoPucKi & WAREN, supra
note 5I, at 43 ("The debtor who can credibly threaten to retain possession of the collateral for a
long time, to run up the cost of repossession, or to reduce the value of the collateral before the
creditor can gain possession, may be able to take advantage of the creditor in post-default
negotiations.").
77 The hypothetical assumes that the value of the collateral has declined since the loan was
made, because an equipment loan ordinarily would not exceed 8o% of the liquidation value. See,
e.g., DeKunder Interview, supra note 58 (transcript at 29) (describing a bank's policy to limit
loans secured by equipment to 8o% of the value of new equipment and 70% of the value of used
equipment).
78 Given the significant inefficiencies of the forced sale procedure for liquidation of collateral,
the hypothetical's assumption that the liquidation value would be more than 8o% of the fairmarket value may even be optimistic.
79 Many factors could cause a borrower to value an asset more highly than the market. For
example, the borrower may have made tangible asset-specific investments that would be wasted if
the asset is lost. In the hypothetical, the borrower might lose not only the value of the drill press
standing alone, but also much of the value of the factory and business that uses the drill press, as
well as the costs of training the employees who operate it. Additionally, the borrower may have
an idiosyncratic or emotional investment in the asset; perhaps the loss of the asset would cause
the borrower to lose a family business. See generally ROBERT NozIcK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITv 21-35 (1993) (discussing how individual attention to sunk costs and symbolic utility can
cause individuals to receive benefits not reflected in market values).
80 The borrower loses an asset that it values at $4oo,ooo and receives a $ioo,ooo credit on its
outstanding loan, for a net loss of $3oo,ooo.
81 See LoPucmi & WARREN, supra note 51, at 43 (explaining that a creditor that can take
possession of collateral immediately "can terminate the debtor's business").
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hood of repayment, the lender
should be willing to make the loan at a
8 2
lower cost to the borrower.

Of course, secured lenders are not alone in having leverage over
borrowers. For example, a lender that advances a line of credit that it
can call on demand has a significant amount of leverage based on its
ability to bring the borrower's business to an immediate standstill.
But the legal advantages that accompany a grant of collateral enhance
a particular and important type of leverage: the ability to inflict loss
through liquidation of the borrower's assets.8 3 To be sure, an unsecured lender can inflict a similar loss by instituting a lawsuit, obtaining a judgment, and executing on a judgment lien. But the
process for collecting unsecured debts tends to be much more protracted than the process for proceeding against collateral, especially
when the borrower actively opposes the lender's efforts to collect the
unsecured loan.8 4 This protracted process often significantly reduces
the practical ability of the lender to inflict losses by liquidating the
borrower's assets because the delay gives the borrower a greater period of time to raise funds to pay off the loan or to protect itself in
other ways (such as by bidding at the sale of the collateral).8 5 Given
the general lack of liquidity experienced by borrowers that are having
trouble making payments on their debts,8

6

the additional time that a

borrower can withstand an unsecured creditor's collection efforts
87
should significantly enhance the borrower's ability to protect itself.

82 As I discuss below, leverage has a negative side as well, which I believe to be one of the
most costly aspects of secured credit. See infra section II.B.2. This discussion of voluntary repayment, however, is designed to show only the circumstances in which leverage is positive; generalizations about the relative prevalence of the positive and negative aspects of leverage are not
required (or, I think, possible).
83 Unlike line-of-credit leverage, liquidation leverage is available even in long-term loans. Because the line-of-credit leverage discussed in the text arises out of the ability of the lender to
terminate the relationship at will, that leverage should not be an important factor in the parties'
efforts to structure a long-term lending relationship.
84 For an entertaining look at the difficulties an unsecured creditor faces in collecting even
after it obtains a judgment, see LoPuciI & WARREN, cited above in note Sx, at 3-20.
85 Another strategy that has developed as a way for borrowers to prevent unsecured lenders
from expeditiously taking control of borrowers' assets is for the distressed borrower to grant a
"blocking" security interest to a friendly coalition of unsecured creditors after the default arises
but before the hostile unsecured creditor obtains a lien on the borrower's assets. See LoPucki,
supra note 33, at 1539-44.
86 For a discussion of the illiquidity of troubled borrowers, see note 74 above.
87 See Triantis, supra note ii, at 246; cf. Interview with Anonymous Mall Developer, in St.
Louis, Mo. (June 20, 1995) [hereinafter Mall Developer Interview] (transcript at 4, on file with the
Harvard Law School Library) (explaining that a regional shopping mall developer's willingness to
grant a substantial lien would enhance the ability of the lender to take the collateral during a
temporary disturbance of cash flow). But see Adler, supra note 7, at 86 ("lilt is unclear why
secured creditors innately have a significantly greater opportunity to misbehave than do unsecured
creditors.").
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This situation often makes the unsecured creditor's leverage considerably less than the secured creditor's. a8
(c) Mitigating Incentive Problems. - The third practical advantage associated with a grant of collateral is the enhancement of the
lender's ability to restrain the borrower from engaging in risky conduct that (in the lender's view) decreases the borrower's ability to repay the loan. A commercial lending transaction differentiates the
interests of the borrower from the interests of the lender, typically by
giving the borrower most of the upside potential and by leaving the
lender with much of the downside potential. For example, if the business makes extraordinary profits, the lender's return on its investment
generally does not increase; if the business fails, the lender's likelihood
of loss increases substantially even though the borrower may lose very
little, especially when the borrower's equity investment is limited. Absent some corrective action, that differentiation of interests leads to a
differentiation of consequences8 9 that can undermine the likelihood of
repayment. A borrower may have a higher preference for risk-taking
in such a situation than it would have if it bore all of the risks of
failure itself, and thus might be less likely to generate the funds
needed for repayment than it would be in the absence of the incentivealtering effects of the loan transaction. 90
88 As Lynn LoPucki and Jay Westbrook have pointed out to me, the leverage of unsecured
lenders could be similar to that of secured creditors when unsecured lenders deal with public
borrowers that must return to the credit market frequently. See Triantis & Daniels, supra note
39, at io84-85 (explaining that a lender can influence corporate governance because its decision to
"exit" can "precipitate the firm's collapse").
89 This Article consistently refers to differentiation of incentives and to the costs of incentives.
I eschew the customary reference to "agency costs" because commentators have applied that term
so broadly that it lacks significant explanatory power in any specific context. See Carlson, supra
note 73, at 2186 n.i8. Jensen and Meckling developed the "agency cost" terminology to describe
the costs that owners of firms incur when the incentives of the managers (the agents) differ from
the incentives of the owners (the principals). See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6o, at 308-IO.
In the context of this Article, use of the term is misleading because it implies that the borrower is
in some sense an "agent" for the lender, an implication that leads many scholars to characterize
conduct by a borrower that maximizes the borrower's wealth as "misbehavior" whenever it does
not perfectly further the interests of the lender. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 71, at 873-75;
Buckley, supra note i2, at 1439-40; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 5, at uISO; Levmore, supra
note 49, at So; Picker, supra note 57, at 646; George G. Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory of
Secured Debt and Creditor Priorities, 8o VA. L. REv. 2155, 2156-57 (i994). But cf. Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 6o, at 333-37 (discussing the "agency costs of debt" without pejorative references to a borrower's pursuit of its incentives). The characterization of the borrower's conduct as
"misbehavior" is erroneous because it ignores the fact that the borrower is just as independent an
economic actor, and therefore just as entitled to pursue its own interests, as the lender. As I
explain in more detail below, the lender's incentives differ from the ideal incentives just as much
as the borrower's incentives do. See infra p. 664. Hence, because neither of the parties has an
incentive in all circumstances to maximize the value of the assets, there is no value-neutral basis
for deciding that one party's pursuit of its incentives should be viewed as misconduct.
90 For general discussions of the unduly risky preferences of borrowers, see EUGENE F. FAMA
& MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 178-81 (1972); Lynn M. LoPucki & William
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If the differentiation of incentives diminishes the likelihood that the
borrower will repay the loan, it increases the costs of the transaction.
Hence, mechanisms that mitigate the differentiation of incentives can
decrease the costs of the transaction by lowering the lender's pre-loan
assessment of the risk of nonpayment. Relying on existing empirical
studies as well as the interviews undertaken for this Article, this section of the Article identifies and explains three different mechanisms
through which secured credit lowers the costs associated with the differentiation of incentives:9 1 focusing the lender's oversight on a particular asset, increasing the net value of covenants that constrain the
borrower's behavior, and increasing the practical leverage that the
lender can use to constrain the borrower's behavior. The section concludes by examining and rejecting a fourth possible mechanism for the
correction of incentives: fostering exclusive lending relationships.
(i) Focusing the Lender's Monitoring. - The simplest way in
which a grant of collateral increases the effectiveness of the lender's
efforts to limit risky behavior is by narrowing the focus of the lender's
monitoring. 92 When the lender has an effective lien on a particular
asset, such as a single office building, it can focus its monitoring on
that asset (and ignore other assets), secure in the knowledge that repayment is likely as long as the liquidation value of the asset remains
greater than the outstanding amount of the loan. 93 When the lender
can limit its attention to a particular asset, rather than scrutinizing the
entire company, monitoring should become less expensive. 94 FurtherC. Whitford, Compensating Unsecured Creditors for Extraordinary Bankruptcy Reorganization
Risks, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1133, 1134-36 (1994); and Tliantis, cited above in note xi, at 234-38.
This Article's discussion of the detrimental effects on incentives that arise from a division of the
interests in a particular asset draws heavily on Yoram Barzel's transaction-costs model of property rights. See YoRA BARZEL, ECONOMIc ANALYsIs OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 1-12 (1989).
91 George Thantis also has argued that secured credit provides benefits by mitigating incentive problems. See Triantis, supra note 89, at 2158-65; Triantis, supra note xi, at 234-49.
Although useful, Triantis's discussions are relatively abstract and devote little attention to the
practical mechanisms through which secured credit can provide those benefits. More fundamentally, his analysis falls to put the benefits in the context of all of the other effects of secured credit
that motivate borrowing decisions. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (criticizing unified
theories of secured credit).
92 Jackson and Kronman present a contrary argument that secured credit is issued to creditors
for whom monitoring is particularly expensive because security renders monitoring less crucial.
See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 5, at 1159-61. As other scholars have pointed out, this
argument is difficult to reconcile with the observed fact that many of the creditors that are most
likely to be adept at monitoring (such as banks) frequently retain security interests. See, e.g.,
Schwartz, supra note 5, at ii n.28; Scott, supra note 12, at 9o9-io.
93 For a discussion of the imprudence of a lender's reliance on liquidation value, see note s5
above.
94 See Coburn Interview, supra note 54 (transcript at 4) ([Y]ou get annual financial statements and various kinds of disclosures, but it's harder to track [the borrower's general financial
condition. It's] much easier to track that piece of collateral that you have, be it a shopping center
or building or whatever it is.").
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more, by allowing the lender to limit its monitoring to certain types of
assets, secured credit makes it easier for the lender to routinize the
monitoring, which can lower the costs of monitoring by decreasing the
expertise necessary to perform it.9s
(ii) Enhancing the Effectiveness of Loan Covenants. - The
most obvious way in which lenders try to solve incentive problems is
by including provisions in the loan documents that allow the lender to
monitor and oversee the borrower's activities. 96 For example, sophisticated loan documents commonly include provisions requiring the borrower to provide regular information reports, allowing the lender to
conduct inspections, and prohibiting (or placing conditions on) certain
types of transactions. 9 7 Those provisions enhance the lender's capacity
to induce the borrower to conduct its affairs in accordance with the
lender's risk-averse interests rather than the borrower's risk-preferent
interests. If secured credit can increase the net value of the provisions,
then it lowers the aggregate cost of the lending transaction. 98
Although the empirical evidence available at this time is limited, I
believe that secured credit enhances the effectiveness of loan covenants
in solving incentive problems. Because secured lenders can focus on
particular assets, it is cost-effective for borrowers to allow those lenders to impose stringent, specific covenants that are effective in protecting the particular assets on which the lender has a lien. The lack of
focus of unsecured lenders makes it impractical for them to insist on
similarly stringent covenants. Loan covenants in the unsecured context focus on global concerns related to company-wide indicators of
financial strength, such as maintenance of the borrower's existence,
provision of information, compliance with minimum standards of
broad financial indicators of income and net worth, and limitations on
the issuance of future debt or liens.99 Occasionally, although only
95 1 owe this point to Jay Westbrook.
96 Empirical evidence suggesting that loan covenants are stricter in debt issued by more

highly leveraged firms demonstrates the close relation between loan covenants and the perceived
level of the risk that the borrower's incentives will lead it to pursue investment preferences that
differ from the lender's incentives. See Mark Carey, Stephen Prowse, John Rea & Gregory Udell,
The Economics of Private Placements: A New Look, FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Aug. r993, at 1, 28; Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in
Bonds, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 565, 593 (1995).
97 See, e.g., MARCEL KAHAN & BRUCE TUCKMAN, PRIVATE VS. PUBLIC LENDING: EVIDENCE

FROM COVENANTS 6-i (Harvard Law Sch. Program in Law and Econs. Discussion Paper No.
1si, i995) (providing an empirical study of the prevalence of various types of covenants in unsecured debt of publicly traded companies).
98 I refer to "net value" because debt covenants lower the aggregate costs of a transaction only
if the value that the covenants provide the lender - limiting losses from the differentiation of
incentives - exceeds the costs that they impose on the parties in aggregate. As I discuss below,
the costs of these provisions are significant, but not likely to exceed the benefits that they provide.
See infra pp. 654-55.
99 See KAHAN & TUCKMAN, supra note 97, at 6-1
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rarely in the case of publicly issued debt, the documents in an unsecured transaction also include provisions barring substantial changes
in the business or mandating that the borrower maintain its property
in good repair. 10 0 These types of covenants can do much to prevent
some of the most flagrant forms of risky behavior, such as inordinate
distributions to shareholders and the issuance of excessive subsequent
debt. 10 ' Because the covenants operate at a business-wide level, however, they do not prevent the borrower from engaging in several other
types of risky activity that can reduce a lender's chances of repayment.1 0 2 For example, covenants do little to overcome the borrower's
natural inclination to engage in risky investment activity, 0 3 because
specific investment decisions frequently do not have the type of immediate business-wide impact covered by the typical covenants in the unsecured credit context.'0 4 Similarly, typical unsecured debt covenants
do nothing to prevent the borrower from forgoing valuable investment
opportunities that may be necessary to maintain the long-term profitability of the business. 0 5
The covenants that tend to be included in secured transactions can
be much more effective in limiting the borrower's tendency toward
risky behavior. The most basic provision is a prohibition on a sale of
the collateral without the lender's consent.'0 6 Similarly, a lender fre100 See id. at
101

15-17.

See, e.g., Scott, supra note

12,

at gi-2o; T2iantis, supra note

ri,

at

235-36.

102 For instance, an investment officer for a major life insurance company characterized the

covenants in publicly traded debt of real estate investment trusts as "in essence very lax." Hamstra Interview, supra note 7o (transcript at 4). She explained that the covenants are "not intended
to be restrictive" of daily operations, but merely to describe "real outside limits beyond which an
investor would be really uncomfortable." Id. (transcript at 5); see also Telephone Interview with
David R. Edlund, Corporate Finance and Debt Manager, Corporate Treasury, Hewlett-Packard
Company (Aug. 21, iggs) [hereinafter Edlund Interview] (transcript at 6, on file with the Harvard
Law School Library) ("Because we don't have that much borrowing relative to the size of the
corporation the covenants [in our loan documents] are fairly minimal. They're really not very
significant.").
103 For description and analysis of that inclination, see Scott, cited above in note I2, at 9g,
and Triantis, cited above in note ii, at 237-38.

104 Consider, for example, a borrower deciding which of two shopping centers to purchase.
Each has the same price and the same expected rate of return (i5% per annum). If one has a
higher variance than the other (20% chance of a 5%loss, 8o% chance of a 2o% return for shop-

ping center #r; 40% chance of a 12% return, 6o% chance of a 17% return for shopping center #2),

a highly leveraged borrower might prefer the shopping center with the higher variance (shopping
center #i). The typical covenants would do nothing to constrain the borrower's choice.
105 See Scott, supra note 12, at 923 ("Negative covenants are not effective in controlling the
conflicts over growth opportunities. The underinvestment problem does not involve a prohibited
action but rather the failure to take an action."); Triantis, supra note ii, at 240 ("[Florcing [managers] to invest in all profitable opportunities is impossible.").
106 See, e.g., NationsBank Mortgage, supra note 6x, § Ig (authorizing the lender to demand
immediate payment of indebtedness if the borrower sells all or any part of the collateral without
the lender's written consent); NationsBank Small-Business Security Agreement, supra note 6x,
§ E(I3) (prohibiting sale of collateral other than inventory without the written consent of the
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quently will prohibit the borrower from going forward with leases and
other significant business decisions about the collateral without first
obtaining the lender's consent.'0 7 Another set of provisions common
in secured lending requires the borrower to maintain the collateral in
good condition and specifies actions that the borrower must perform,
such as the maintenance of insurance and the payment of taxes.' 0 8 In
the aggregate, these provisions limit the most common ways in which
borrowers' incentives might encourage conduct adverse to the interests
of lenders.
At least in theory, a lender could include provisions in unsecured
debt agreements that prevent the borrower from selling its assets or
making any major decisions about operations without the lender's consent. And if lenders could employ those provisions just as easily in
unsecured documentation as in secured documentation, then the grant.
of collateral would not be the cause of the provisions' effectiveness.
The provisions' prevalence in secured transactions and general absence
from unsecured transactions, 0 9 however, is convincing evidence that
secured credit makes the provisions substantially more effective. 10
lender). If the loan is secured by a floating collateral base (such as financing of accounts receivable or inventory), the lender will not be able to control the disposition of the collateral because it
is the nature of the business for the collateral to come and go. In that situation, this particular
benefit of secured credit would be diminished considerably.
107 See, e.g., NationsBank Small-Business Security Agreement, supra note 61, § E(13). Several
scholars have suggested that the security interest itself protects lenders against asset substitution.
See, e.g., Adler, supra note 7, at 78-79; John D. Leeth & Jonathan A. Scott, The Incidence of
Secured Debt: Evidencefrom the Small Business Community, 24 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 379, 38o-8i (1989); Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt,
and Optimal Capital Structure: Comment, 34 J. FIN. 247, 250 (1979). Without the covenants,
however, the security interest would do little or nothing to protect the lender from the borrower's
risk-preferent incentives.
108 See, e.g., NationsBank Mortgage, supra note 61, §§ 5-6 (requiring the borrower in a commercial real estate mortgage to pay all applicable taxes and maintain insurance as required by the
lender); NationsBank Small-Business Security Agreement, supra note 61, § E(2), (3) (requiring the
borrower in a small-business security agreement to maintain insurance on collateral and to protect
collateral from tax liens).
109 My empirical research suggests that asset-specific provisions are not common in unsecured
loan transactions. See Hamstra Interview, supra note 70 (transcript at 5) (statement of life insurance company investment officer) (asserting that unsecured debt agreements of publicly traded
real estate investment trusts do not include covenants relating to specific assets); Manufacturer
Treasurer Interview, supra note 54 (transcript at 5) (describing covenants in standard commercialpaper documentation and in long-term unsecured offering as insignificant to the operation of the
company); Massie Interview, supra note 54 (transcript at 7) (statement of manager of securities
portfolio for life insurance company) (stating that there are no asset-specific covenants in the
typical unsecured debt issues that he purchases); Mueller Interview, supra note 54 (transcript at
13, i9-2o) (explalning that unsecured loan transactions by his bank typically do not restrict treatment of particular assets). Standard industry forms support the same conclusion. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR FOUND., CORPORATE DEBT FINANCING
DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS art XO(1971).

PROJECT,

COMMENTARIES

ON MODEL

110 Bob Rasmussen offered me an alternate explanation, proposing that a characteristic of borrowers that encourages creditors to require a security interest (such as the perceived riskiness of
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The reason for the relationship is easy to see. In the secured context,
the priority rights associated with collateral preserve for the secured
lender the benefits that arise out of constraints on the borrower's use
of the collateral. In the unsecured context, such constraints only increase the likelihood of repayment to the extent that they actually improve the overall stability of the company. Because this larger goal is
much more difficult, such constraints tend to be fairly ineffective: the
cost of enforcement frequently would exceed any benefits to the
lender.
Even if covenants sometimes can enhance the lender's ability to
constrain the borrower from unduly risky activity, the costs of this
constraint are significant. 111 First, the administration of the covenants
requires the expenditure of a significant amount of time and money by
borrowers, who must seek approval from lenders for transactions covered by the documents, and by lenders, who must evaluate the requests. 1 2 Second, and perhaps more important, these provisions
subject aspects of the borrower's business to the direction of a party
whose incentives differ substantially from the borrower's. The
lender's goal in evaluating proposals is to maximize the likelihood of
repayment, not to maximize the value of the borrower's equity, or
even to maximize the total value of the enterprise. When lenders hinthe borrower) increases the perceived benefits of the covenants, which in turn leads to their prevalence in secured transactions. See supra note 96 (presenting evidence that riskier borrowers endure stricter covenants). I find Rasmussen's suggestion intriguing; indeed, it may be part of the
answer. I doubt that it is a complete answer, however, because my evidence suggests that assetspecific covenants appear even in secured loans to relatively creditworthy borrowers. See, e.g.,
Robertson Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at io)(discussing asset-specific covenants in loans
to a highly rated public borrower). Furthermore, my hypothesis better explains the particular way
in which covenants in secured agreements differ from covenants in unsecured agreements. My
evidence does not suggest that the covenants in secured transactions are more stringent in the
abstract; it suggests that they are more stringent in their focus on specific assets.
111 Lenders take account of the costs of covenants in structuring transactions. See, e.g., JOHNSON & JOHNSON, supra note 58, at x61 (American Bankers Association textbook) (stating that
"[ft]he
added protection [from taking a security interest] must be balanced against the costs associated with perfecting the lien and monitoring and controlling the assets').
112 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Carl Evans, Chief Executive Officer, Texas Pneumatic
Tools, Inc. (July 5, x995) [hereinafter Evans Interview] (transcript at r2, 17, 21-22, on file with
the Harvard Law School Library) (explaining that he recently switched the principal lending relationship of the Texas-based industrial tool company because of unwillingness to adhere to loan
covenants sought by the existing lender); Telephone Interview with Jocelyn Sears, American General Realty Advisers, Inc. (July 31, x995) (transcript at 3, on file with the Harvard Law School
Library) (statement of director of department responding to borrower requests for consents) (estimating that, on a portfolio of 1300 commercial real estate loans, a particular lender receives 200
requests each year for consents to easements, leases, subordinate liens, and similar matters). The
president of a developer specializing in community shopping centers anchored by grocery stores
stated: "I'm probably supposed to go to them [on major new leases] but typically, forget about it.
You just go and do it. Now is that a default?" Interview with Anonymous Shopping Center
Developer (July ii, x995) [hereinafter Shopping Center Developer Interview] (transcript at 14, on
file with the Harvard Law School Law Library).
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der value-increasing business decisions, they impose costs that offset
the benefits of a lender's ability to prevent value-decreasing business

decisions. The available evidence suggests that those costs are considerable. 113 Because asset-specific covenants persist in secured lending,

even in loans to relatively creditworthy and sophisticated borrowers, it
is difficult to believe that they are not cost-effective.1 1 4 The point is
simply that the offsetting costs make the net benefits much less substantial than the scholarly literature on monitoring suggests.
(iii) Effects of Leverage. - The third way in which security can

prevent the borrower from engaging in unduly risky behavior is a byproduct of the leverage discussed above. 115 The lender's ability to in-

flict severe losses on the borrower through the exercise of the lender's
rights in the borrower's collateral enhances the borrower's incentive to

refrain from conduct that the lender views as unduly risky and to operate its business in accordance with the lender's desires."

6

The lever-

age does more than encourage the borrower to comply with the
restrictions that the parties have negotiated and memorialized in the

applicable documentation. A prudent borrower would be wary of taking technically permissible actions that the borrower thinks might

trouble the lender sufficiently to increase the likelihood that the lender
will seize upon a minor default to justify calling the loan. 1 7 The abil-

ity of security to give the lender expansive influence over the bor113 Companies quite commonly make significant payments to bondholders to induce them to
release loan covenants in previously issued debt agreements. This practice suggests that those
covenants frequently impair profitable transactions. See Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Do
Bondholders Lose from Junk Bond Covenant Changes?, 66 J. Bus. 499, 502-04 (1993) (presenting
an empirical study of transactions in which debtors have paid their bondholders to release covenants); see also supra note 112 (presenting analogous anecdotal evidence).
114 This belief is buttressed by the statement of a bank division manager that competition
makes it difficult to insist on firm loan covenants without jeopardizing the deal. See Mueller
Interview, supra note 54 (transcript at i8-x9). He explained that his institution experienced considerable losses on real estate loans during the last recession and said that he believes that strict
loan covenants substantially improve the likelihood of repayment. Accordingly, his institution is
willing to lose business rather than weaken its loan covenants. See id.; see also RCiHARD S.
iMARKET 25-27 (Iggo) (describing
WILSON & FRANK J. FABozzi, THE NEW CORPORATE BOND
how Moody's takes account of bond covenants in determining what rating it will give to proposed debt issues); Mai E. Iskandar-Datta & Douglas R. Emery, An Empirical Investigation of
the Role of Indenture Provisions in Determining Bond Ratings, I8 J. BANK NG & FIN. 93, z09
(1994) (reporting an empirical study of rated bond issues that concluded that "indenture provisions
significantly affect the rating of a new debt issue").
11 See supra pp. 645-49.
116 See, e.g., DeKunder Interview, supra note 58 (transcript at 3) ("[W]hen you're looking at
collateral, you're looking at... the fact that.., you're going to ... try to control the situation if
the borrower gets into trouble.").
117 See David Gray Carlson, Debt Collection as Rent Seeking, 79 MINN. L. REv. 817, 825-26
(1995) (describing how secured credit can "reduce the debtor into a state of servility"); Scott, supra
note 12, at 945 ('Creditors believe that security is useful in causing the borrower to weigh carefully the consequences of ... wrongful or careless business actions."); Office Building Developer
Interview, supra note 58 (transcript at 12) (describing lenders' practice of using technical defaults
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rower's daily decisionmaking -

even in circumstances not foreseen at

the time the loan was made -

can go far toward diminishing the

incentive differentiation created by the underlying loan transaction.
(iv) Fostering Exclusive Lending Relationships. - I close this
section by considering the possibility that secured credit fosters exclu-

sive lending relationships that solve the incentive problems entirely, a
thesis articulated by Bob Scott in one of the most prominent and well-

received articles in the field. 1 " The main thrust of Scott's argument is
that the use of an exclusive secured lending arrangement will cause
"each party [to]... act as if it owned all of the property rights in the
prospect." 1 9 The argument has a strong commonsense appeal: it
seems obvious that a borrower or a lender will think twice about acting contrary to the interests of another party when the other party has
the ability to retaliate in future transactions as well as in the transaction at hand. 20
Several problems, however, undermine Scott's thesis.

First,

although Scott explains that exclusive relationships give each party an
incentive to refrain from upsetting the other, he does not show why
the parties' incentives would become exactly the same. Even in a
long-term, exclusive lending relationship, the lender's interests - in
most or all of its projects with the borrower - will favor an approach
considerably more cautious than the approach dictated by the interests
of the borrower.' 2 ' Second, I see no reason for the benefits of relational lending to be limited to secured lenders; unsecured lenders are
just as capable as secured lenders of building relationships with their
22
borrowers.

in an effort to cause borrowers to "volunteer something" that the borrowers are not obligated to
do under the applicable documents).
118 See Scott, supra note 12, at 916-i9.
119 Id. at 918; see id. at g6-ig, 936-37 (arguing that optimal development under secured
financing requires an exclusive relationship between the borrower and the lender).
120 See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 267-69 (iggi) (explaining how the
"reputation effect" enhances the stability of long-term commercial relationships); see also Arnoud
WA. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated
Credit Market Game, 35 INT'L ECON. REV.899, 904-14 (1994) (showing through a formal model
how reputational lending can limit the borrower's ability to externalize risk by smoothing out
profits and losses).
121 See supra p. 649.
122 One banker who specializes in unsecured loans explained: "[What I'm always trying to do
is build partnerships with my customers so anything he wants to do financially he ought to come
to his banker first." Wendel Interview, supra note 40 (transcript at 22). Indeed, if anything, the
existing empirical evidence suggests a relationship directly opposite to the relationship that Scott
posits: a significant inverse correlation between lengthy relationships and collateral. See Allen N.
Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance, 68
J. Bus. 351, 372-77 (I995).

1997]

EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF SECURED CREDIT

Finally, and most importantly, the facts appear to be inconsistent
with Scott's premise. The existing empirical evidence strongly indicates that exclusive lending relationships are much less common than
Scott's analysis suggests. For example, a study of several thousand
small businesses that examined only lending from banks (thus omitting
several possible types of secured lenders) found that a mere twenty-six
percent of borrowers with multiple secured loans
received all of their
123
secured bank loans from a single institution.
Evidence from the field also suggests, albeit somewhat tentatively,
that exclusive secured lending relationships are rather unusual. I interviewed seven borrowers with significant amounts of secured debt.
These borrowers are sufficiently different tobe fairly representative of
a large portion of the universe of lending transactions: two publicly
traded real estate developers; an industrial tool company; a computer
services provider; a late-stage pharmaceutical development, sales, and
marketing company; and two privately held real estate developers.
Every one of these borrowers indicated that it had outstanding secured debt held by more than one lender. 1 24 The consensus from such
a wide variety of borrowers provides persuasive evidence that exclu25
sive secured lending relationships are quite rare.
Accordingly, whatever the benefits of exclusive lending relationships might be, the relative rarity of such relationships deprives them
of any significant explanatory force with respect to the general pattern
of secured credit. This is not to suggest that relationships do not play
an important role in the lending market or that they are irrelevant to
the decision whether to grant collateral. On the contrary, the effects
of
26 I
relationships are crucial to the structure of lending transactions.
See Berger & Udell, supra note 122, at 370-72.
124 See Evans Interview, supra note i12 (transcript at 3-4); Mall Developer Interview, supra
note 87 (transcript at i-2); Office Building Developer Interview, supra note 58 (transcript at 2);
Pharmaceutical Company Interview, supra note 20 (transcript at 2); Robertson Interview, supra
note 44 (transcript at i); Shopping Center Developer Interview, supra note 112 (transcript at 3-4);
Telephone Interview with William S.H. Stuart, President, WSHS Enterprises, Inc. (July 12, 1995)
[hereinafter Stuart Interview] (transcript at 4, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
12S Of course, such a small sample cannot justify any broad conclusions about the precise frequency of exclusive secured lending relationships. Additional evidence to support this argument is
available from the preliminary results of an empirical study of distressed loans. Out of 23 randomly selected loans in which Deutsche Financial Services Corporation elected to terminate the
lending relationship, Deutsche Financial Services was the sole secured lender of record in only
three cases. The average number of secured lenders of record at the time of Deutsche Financial
Services' loan was 3.9. See Mann, supra note 55 (manuscript at 7).
126 Berger and Udell's study, for example, presents statistically significant data suggesting that
a i0-year banking relationship would lower the cost of a firm's credit by 48 basis points and the
use of collateral from 53% to 37% of its loans. See Berger & Udell, supra note 122, at 369,
372-75. A more recent study analyzing the terms of bank credit lines reached a similar conclusion, finding that longer relationships lead to lower monitoring efforts and thus indirectly to lower
interest rates. See David W. Blackwell & Drew B. Winters, Banking Relationships and the Effect
123
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can say, however, that the evidence strongly undermines Scott's characterization of the significance of exclusivity.
B.

The Burdens: Why Wouldn't a Borrower Always Secure
Its Debt?

The foregoing discussion once again raises the question of why
borrowers do not always secure their debts.12 7 In light of the advantages of secured credit, answering this question entails identifying the
costs of secured credit, the topic of this section. Once both the benefits and burdens have been identified clearly, understanding the decisionmaking processes of borrowers and lenders will be much easier.
Although the precise nature of the burdens of secured credit has
been difficult to identify, borrowers typically have a strong preference
for the unsecured loan over the secured loan, even if all other significant terms - amount, interest rate, term, and amortization - are
equal. Individuals familiar with the preferences of commercial borrowers believe that borrowers will pay a considerable premium to
avoid having to grant collateral. Professor Homer Kripke, for example, asserted that his experience in "the factual world" indicated "in no
uncertain terms that firms that can avoid giving secured debt do
so."128 My research was consistent with Kripke's observation: the various kinds of commercial borrowers and lenders that I interviewed
generally evidenced a willingness to accept a significant increase in interest rates to avoid the burdens of a secured transaction. 12 9 This anecdotal evidence clearly indicates that a grant of collateral imposes
some additional costs.
The burdens that secured credit imposes on borrowers do not explain the variation in the use of secured credit. To understand why
some borrowers, but not others, secure their debts despite the costs, an
exploration of how the burdens of secured credit actually arise is necessary. This section explores two general ways in which secured credit
could increase the aggregate burden of loan transactions: first, by increasing the costs of closing loans; and second, by increasing the costs
of administering loans. I conclude that there are two significant costs
of secured credit. The first is the increase in information costs associof Monitoring on Loan Pricing 17-20 (Mar. x99 6 ) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).

127 See sufra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing the ubiquity puzzle of secured
credit posed by Alan Schwartz and Barry Adler).
128 Kripke, supra note i5, at 969.
129 See Evans Interview, supra note X12 (transcript at 9-io) (preferring that his company pay
an interest rate premium of about two percent per annum to avoid having to grant a security
interest in connection with a working-capital loan); Pharmaceutical Company Interview, supra
note 20 (transcript at 3-4) (stating that he would be interested in an interest rate increase of one
percent per annum if his inventory lender would forgo taking a security interest in his inventory).
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ated with closing a secured transaction, at least in the context of public companies. The second, which is not limited to public companies,
is the increase in administration costs due to the lender's power to

prevent the borrower from using its assets in the most profitable way.
i.

The Costs of Closing the Transaction. -

This section evalu-

ates the possibility that secured credit makes lending transactions more
costly by increasing the costs of closing those transactions. I consider
three separate types of closing costs: information costs, documentation
costs, and filing fees.
(a) Information Costs. - In the course of closing any type of
lending transaction, both parties incur significant information costs.
The borrower incurs information costs in identifying and analyzing the
various financing products available in the market. The lender incurs
costs in investigating the merits of the transaction. The lender typi30
of the
cally investigates the financial strength or creditworthiness1
3
of
value
on
the
borrower with some care.' ' A secured lender relying
incenthe collateral as a significant source of repayment also has an
tive to investigate the collateral. 32 The likelihood that both secured
and unsecured lenders will incur considerable investigation costs
makes it difficult to ascertain how information costs in the secured
130 Financial strength and creditworthiness are not entirely objective concepts. In this Article,
I generally refer to the "strength" or "financial strength" of a borrower to indicate the group of
attributes that enhance the perception of lenders and the financial markets that the borrower will
repay its debts as promised. Rating agencies analyze these attributes for public companies in
great detail. See, e.g., S & P's RATINGS GROUP, STANDARD & POOR'S CORPORATE FINANCE
CRITERIA 3-4 (1994) (describing the role of ratings in evaluating securities); WILSON & FABOZZI,
supra note 114, at 23 ("A bond rating is an indicator or assessment of the issuer's ability to meet
its principal and interest payments in a timely manner in accordance with the terms of the
issue.").
131 See WILSON & FABOZZI, supra note 114, at 23-44 (explaining how ratings are determined).
In some kinds of heavily asset-based transactions, such as purchase-money loans on automobiles,
the lender might forgo any serious investigation of the credit of the borrower because of the
decision to treat the collateral as the primary source of repayment in the event of default. Also, a
sophisticated unsecured lender might forgo the costs of investigating credit case by case and instead charge an interest rate that reflects its assessment of the likelihood of default over the whole
population of borrowers that have not been investigated on an individual basis. For example,
credit card issuers come close to following this course. Even in that context, however, the issuers
rely on relatively sophisticated analyses of the likely creditworthiness of the relevant population.
See Elizabeth Warren, Mortgaging the Future: The Consumer Debt Binge of the ig8os, at 105-12
(Aug. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library); see also Saul
Hansell, Merchants of Debt: This Credit Card Is Tailored to You, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, § 3,
at i (discussing increasingly sophisticated methods for estimating the creditworthiness of potential
credit card customers).
132 If the lender is taking the collateral for reasons unrelated to its value - to inhibit subsequent lending, for instance - the lender might forgo substantial investigation of the collateral.
Even in these cases, however, the lender is still likely to ascertain whether there were any prior
security interests in the collateral. See, e.g., DeKunder Interview, supra note 58 (transcript at
28-29) (explaining that the bank would do a U.C.C. search, even if it were not relying on liquidation of the collateral, simply "to have some control").
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lending context compare with analogous costs in the unsecured lending
context.
Although my research does not support any general predictions
about the situations in which information costs will be relevant to the
secured credit decision, it does shed light on the lending decisions of
publicly traded companies. The clearest evidence comes from an interview with the chief financial officer of a publicly traded real estate
investment trust with a market capitalization of about one billion dollars. 13 3 In order to obtain financing for his company at the lowest
possible cost, he carefully evaluates the relative costs of transactions. 134 Based on his experience, he told me that the "all-in" 135 transaction costs of producing a typical ten-million-dollar unsecured loan
36
for his company would be in the range of seventy-five basis points'
(three-quarters of one percent of the loan amount).13 7 He then stated
that a comparable secured transaction 138 would cost about 15o to 200
basis points.' 3 9 He explained that the difference in costs arose from
charges that his
the large charges for appraisals and title company
4°
company would incur in the secured transaction.
These costs, of course, are primarily the costs of acquiring information about the value of the collateral and the borrower's title to it. In
an unsecured transaction, creditors focus on the creditworthiness of
the borrower as a whole. When the borrower is publicly traded, creditors readily can obtain information without any additional expense,
133See Robertson Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at I).
134 See id. (transcript at 3-4).
13SSee id. (transcript at 3). This figure includes fees to investment bankers and lawyers, closing costs, and all other costs attributable to the transaction. See id.
136 A basis point is a "measure for interest rates and bond yields." A single "basis point equals
one-hundredth of a percent (.oi percent)." SUSAN LEE, ABZs OF MONEY & FINANCE 35 (1988).
Analysts use basis points typically "to measure small changes in interest rates." ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BANKING & FINANCE 133 (Charles J. Woelfel ed., xoth ed. 1994).
137 The treasurers of two large, publicly traded manufacturers provided similar estimates. See
Kimmins Interview, supra note 67 (transcript at 5)(stating that capitalized transaction costs resulted in an overall increase in the cost of debt of about io basis points per year); Manufacturer
Treasurer Interview, supra note 54 (transcript at 4) (estimating ioo basis points in total up-front
transaction costs).
138 He referred to a $Io million "specimen" mortgage on a single freestanding shopping center
with a loan-to-value ratio of 70%. See Robertson Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 21).
139 See id. He also indicated that the difference in cost would be even greater if the transaction were a large, underwritten issue. He estimated that a large-denomination unsecured offering
for his company would have total transaction costs of about 3oo basis points, whereas the analogous secured transaction (a collateralized mortgage obligation) would be "probably twice as expensive." Id. (transcript at 3-4).
140 See id. (transcript at 2, 4). Senior bank lending officers who specialize in loans to relatively
large borrowers attributed high secured debt costs to similar factors. See Telephone Interview
with Cynthia C. Sanford, Senior Vice President, NationsBank of 'Iexas, NA. (July 20, 1995) [hereinafter Sanford Interview] (transcript at 17, on file with the Harvard Law School Library);
Wendel Interview, supra note 40 (transcript at 16).
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either from filings required by the securities laws or from the efforts of
analysts evaluating the value of the company's outstanding securities. 141 Therefore, the existence of detailed financial information about
public companies can make unsecured loan transactions considerably
less expensive than comparable secured transactions. 4 2 This factor
provides a significant (and previously unidentified 43) bias in favor of

unsecured credit for public companies.
(b) Documentation Costs. - Documenting the transaction is another source of costs. Whether the borrower grants collateral or not,
the borrower and the lender incur costs in formalizing the arrange141 See Wendel Interview, supra note 40 (transcript at 17) (describing his reliance on "ioQ's,
ioK's, access to public markets, long operating history . . . [jiust a hell of a lot more public
information and available credit information for me to take comfort in"); see also MARK CAREY,
STEPHEN PROWSE, JOHN REA & GREGORY UDELL, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PRIVATE PLACE-

MENT MARKET at vii (Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Staff Study No. 166, 1993)
(contrasting the "publicly available information" for "large, well-known firms" with the "information problem" posed by less well-known companies). Indeed, Robertson's comments suggest that
publicly traded companies must provide more information to rating agencies monitoring their performance than to their lenders. See Robertson Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 9).
142 This generalization must be qualified in two ways. First, the principal of a publicly held
company that has not yet obtained a rating from the rating agencies explained that the issuance
of his company's first publicly traded unsecured debt would be more expensive than the issuance
of secured debt because of the costs of educating the market about his company for the first time.
See Office Building Developer Interview, supra note 58 (transcript at 5-6). In his circumstances,
the unsecured debt seemed to be much more expensive in the short run, although he planned to
go forward with the transaction.
Second, the information-cost differential described in the text probably does not extend to
small borrowers. Of course, Dun & Bradstreet and similar businesses do provide credit information about smaller companies, and lenders rely on this information in evaluating loans. See, e.g.,
NationsBank of Texas, NA., Business Banking Scorecard Worksheet [hereinafter NationsBank
Banking Scorecard] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (taking account of the borrower's credit rating); Wirengard Interview, supra note 65 (transcript at 5) (describing his company's reliance on Dun & Bradstreet reports at the time a lending relationship begins). Hence,
there are circumstances in which the costs of acquiring information about collateral will increase
the costs of a secured transaction relative to an alternative unsecured transaction. See, e.g., Stuart
Interview, supra note 124, at 1o (statement by the Chief Executive Officer of a closely held computer services company) (stating that transaction costs for secured debt are higher than transaction costs for unsecured debt "because of all the brain damage in going out and getting appraisals
and all th[e] other [requirements of a secured loan]"). Based on my interviews, however, lenders
to smaller companies appear to rely much less on standard credit reports than they do on information that they obtain and evaluate themselves. See, e.g., DeKunder Interview, supra note 58
(transcript at 3-4) (discussing reliance on subjective evaluation of character of borrower); NationsBank Banking Scorecard, supra (describing point ranges in which the officer has discretion to
approve or reject the loan, even after the officer evaluates not only the credit bureau report, but
also the type of business, the age of the business, corporate structure, and account balances); see
also supra note 67 (discussing the risks of relying on credit reports).
143 Although the excellent study by Mark Carey, Stephen Prowse, John Rea, and Gregory
Udell provides considerable evidence of the ways in which information problems limit the access
of small companies to the public debt markets, see CAREY, PROWSE, REA & UDELL, supra note
141, at 15-26, the study does not analyze the relationship between this effect and the use of
secured credit.
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ment and reducing it to a set of loan documents that specify the terms
of the transaction. On this point, I see no basis for questioning Jim
White's conclusion that a grant of collateral will not generally have a
significant effect on the costs of documentation 44 because all but the
smallest transactions involve loan documents regardless of whether the
borrower grants collateral. And whenever there are loan documents,
the lender, as a repeat player, has an incentive to reduce the costs of
documentation by developing form documents that can be used in relatively standard transactions. 14 Although costs may increase as transactions become larger or more complicated, this phenomenon is not
dependent on the presence or absence of collateral in the transaction.
Of course, transactions that involve unusual, varied, or widely dispersed collateral might have higher drafting and negotiating costs than
transactions that do not involve collateral, but it also is possible to
imagine unsecured transactions with particularly high documentation
costs. For example, public offerings might face complicated regulatory
obstacles imposed by agencies such as the SEC, the IRS, or the EPA.
In summary, there is no necessary connection between the existence of
security and the level of documentation costs. In most cases, documentation costs will not affect the decision whether to grant collateral.
(c) Filing Fees. - Filing fees are the final category of closing
costs. Because unsecured transactions, unlike secured transactions,
typically can be made fully effective without any public filing whatsoever, they are generally less expensive than secured transactions. The
costs of filing therefore represent a distinct expenditure incurred solely
because of the decision to secure the transaction. Compliance with
that requirement, in turn, includes not just the actual filing fee, but
also all of the costs associated with determining exactly what to file
and where to file it.146 Nevertheless, the significance of filing fees in
the decisionmaking process should not be overstated. 14 7 Even in complex transactions, available evidence suggests that these costs are only

144 See White, supra note iS, at 490 (arguing that inclusion in a particular transaction of a
"security agreement likely added trivial costs"). But see Picker, supra note 57, at 651 C'The costs
of drafting and recording a mortgage increase, rather than decrease, the costs of making the

loan.").
145 See Michael Klausner, Corporations,Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REV. 757, 774-89 (iggs); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Corporate Contracting: Standardization, Innovation and the Role of Contracting Agents 3-16 (Sept. 1995) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Harvard Law School Library); ef. Kahan, supra note 96, at 586-87 (discussing the
pros and cons of standardization).
146 See Steven L. Harris, The Interaction of Articles 6 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
A Study in Conveyancing, Priorities,and Code Interpretation, 39 VAND. L. REV. 179, 212-13
(1986).

147 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 7, at 8o; Carlson, supra note 73, at 219o; White, supra note xs,

at

490.
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about one twenty-fifth of one percent of the entire loan amount. 148 To
give this number some perspective, one twenty-fifth of one percent of
the costs of a $ioo,ooo small-business loan would be about $40.
range would be sufficient to alter the decision only in
Amounts in this 49
very rare cases.'

In conclusion, neither documentation costs nor filing costs are
likely to play a significant role in most decisions about whether to include collateral in a lending transaction. Information costs, on the
other hand, are a significant closing cost. These costs strongly encourage unsecured credit in transactions involving large borrowers.
The borrower's deci2. The Costs of Administering the Loan. sion to grant collateral also can increase the aggregate costs of the
transaction by increasing the costs that the transaction imposes on the
parties during the pendency of the loan.' 5 0 At first glance, the large
amounts of time and money that borrowers and lenders spend administering the covenants typically included in documentation for secured transactions would seem to be a significant and obvious cost of
secured credit.' 5 ' But these costs cannot explain the pattern of secured
credit, because the parties could avoid the costs by omitting the covenants. Nothing about secured credit obligates the parties to incur
these expenditures. The prevalence of such contract provisions therefore suggests that their benefits - which result from their reduction of
the lender's pre-loan estimate of the likelihood of nonpayment - outweigh their costs.
To explain the pattern of secured credit, it is necessary to identify
an aspect of the secured credit system that is inherent in the grant of
collateral. A cost that the parties can avoid by redesigning the docu148 See Peter A. Alces, Abolish the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MNN. L. REV. 679, 691 n.39
(x995). Alces's source did not provide sufficient data to determine a precise percentage of the loan
amount for the entire sample. Alces's source gives loan amount and U.C.C. filing billings for only
five representative transactions, see id., a base of information that is not adequate to justify any
reliable generalizations. Nevertheless, the data can provide a rough approximation of the percent-

age: the billings in the four largest of these five transactions total $87,940, which represents .o36%
of the $242 million aggregate loan amount ($87,940 - $242,ooo,ooo = .o36%). See id.
149 That is not to say that filing costs are never relevant See infra p. 681 (discussing the costs
incurred when suppliers file for security interests on products sold to national retailers).
ISO I do not consider the costs that secured credit imposes upon default. As discussed above,
secured credit is designed to (and probably does) enhance the likelihood that the borrower can be
forced to repay the loan upon default See supra p. 639. Viewed from the joint pre-loan perspective, this enhancement is beneficial because it lowers the sum that is necessary to induce the
lender to advance the loan. If the costs of proceeding against collateral in a particular context
exceed the costs of pursuing the ordinary remedies available to an unsecured creditor, one would
expect the secured creditor simply to pursue recovery directly against the borrower rather than
against the collateral.
I' See supra pp. 654-55.
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mentation is not "inherent," because such a cost is not likely to persist
unless it is attached to a countervailing benefit of greater value. The
most obvious cost that the parties cannot readily "wire around" is a
cost tied to one of the most significant benefits of secured credit discussed in section lI.A: the leverage that is specially attributable to the
grant of collateral. To show how this leverage is a cost inherent in
secured credit, this section first explains why the lender might use its
leverage to increase the costs of the transaction, and then discusses the
difficulties of eliminating the lender's ability to exercise leverage.
(a) The Incentives of the Lender. - As discussed above, one of
the most significant problems that the parties must confront in a loan
transaction is the differentiation of the borrower's and lender's incentives. 5 2 Because the parties will bear and receive differing shares of
future losses and gains from the business, their preferences about business decisions will differ.
Earlier discussion explained how secured credit can lessen the costs
of the differing incentives by reining in the borrower's tendency toward risky conduct. The division of interests inherent in a loan transaction, however, also moves the lender's incentives away from the
ideal (an incentive to maximize the expected present value of the collateral). The lender's disproportionately large share of the downside
risk and disproportionately small share of the upside potential give it
preferences that are as unduly conservative as the borrower's preferences are unduly risky. A lender that pursues these preferences does
more than deter value-decreasing risky transactions; it also deters
53
value-increasing risky transactions.1
(b) The Inevitable Costs of Leverage. - One of the most salient
features of the secured credit system is that it gives lenders the leverage to induce borrowers to adhere to the lenders' preferences, even
with respect to actions not specified in the applicable loan documents.
As discussed above, this leverage can provide one of the most significant benefits of secured credit.' 5 4 But this leverage also has a negative
side, which is much more problematic than prior commentators have
152 See supra pp. 649-58.
153See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Hands-ying Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured Debt, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 628, 649 (1992); Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A ComparativeExamination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REv. 73, 77-81 (1995); Scott,
supra note 12, at 929; Paul M. Shupack, Preferred Capital Structures and the Question of Filing,
79 MiNN. L. REV. 787, 814 (1995). Strangely, many of the commentators who have observed the
unduly risky incentives created for the borrower when debt divides future returns have failed to
recognize the equal and opposite effect on the lender's incentives, and thus implicitly have treated
the lender's incentives as satisfactory. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 7, at 76-77; Hideki Kanda &
Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities,80 VA. L. REV. 2103, 2oS-Ix (1994).
114 See supra pp. 645-49, 655-56.
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appreciated. 5 5 Coupled with the lender's risk-averse preferences, the
lender's leverage creates a likelihood that the lender will block the
most profitable uses of the borrower's assets and thus increase the aggregate costs of a secured transaction. 5 6 Because the borrower is well
aware of these potential costs, the borrower views the secured transaction as more costly and thus less advantageous than an analogous unsecured transaction. As one borrower explained, in a secured loan
"[y]ou just don't have the same flexibility of dealing with your proper5 7
ties as if you owned them unencumbered."
As with any aspect of the credit system that imposes costs, it is
necessary to ask why borrowers and lenders do not restructure their
transactions to avoid the costs. The answer is that the only feasible
way to avoid the leverage is to make the transaction unsecured. The
lender's ability to force liquidation of the collateral to satisfy the debt
is inherent in a grant of collateral. There are only two ways to limit
the lender's ability to harm the borrower through exercise of the leverage that arises from the threat of forced liquidation: limiting the losses
that accompany liquidation or limiting the lender's opportunities for
exercising that leverage to control the borrower's conduct. Neither solution, however, is feasible as a general matter.
The first way to limit leverage would be to limit the amount of the
losses that the lender can inflict. The main foundation of the secured
creditor's leverage is the differential between the collateral's value to
the borrower and the amount that the lender would credit on the loan
if the collateral were liquidated under the security agreement or mortgage.' 5- One basis for this differential seems plainly ineradicable: the
fact that the value of the collateral in the borrower's business is likely
to be substantially greater than the fair-market value of the collateral. 9 Thus, even if the market for refinancing offered distressed
borrowers immediate and costless borrowing up to the full fair-market
155 Several scholars have observed that borrowers lose flexibility when they cede some control

of the business to lenders. See Bowers, supra note

12, at 65-67; Carlson, supra note 73, at 219o;
Tdantis, supra note ii, at 248. These scholars have not, however, recognized the importance of
the cost because they have not connected it with the differentiation of incentives between borrowers and lenders. Because of the differentiation, the loss of control is not just "inconvenient," see
Carlson, supra note 73, at 219o; it causes a significant alteration of the investment preferences
that will guide the operation of the business.
156 See Mueller Interview, supra note 54 (transcript at I7) (discussing loan officer's caution in
accepting proposals from troubled borrowers); cf. Coburn Interview, supra note 54 (transcript at
24) (stating that loan officer's company rejects around io% of the requests submitted by borrowers for approval of new leases).
157 Robertson Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at io); see also Kinmins Interview, supra
note 67 (transcript at xo) (explaining that his company's aversion to secured debt rests on "a
question of flexibility and having to deal with it").
158 See supra pp. 646-47.
159 However perfectly the market may function to deal with asset-specific investments (such as
the investments in the factory in which the asset is located), borrowers will continue to have some
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value of the borrower's assets, borrowers would stand to lose considerably on foreclosure.
The other basis for the differential - the likelihood that liquidation will not even bring the market value - may be more tractable
than the first, but it remains beyond the control of the parties. The
financial system does not provide immediate and costless financing to
distressed borrowers, 160 and the parties cannot repair the existing secured credit system to increase the value that it returns upon liquidation of collateral. Of course, the borrower can protect itself by
purchasing the collateral, but the general illiquidity of defaulting borrowers indicates that in many cases this solution is not practical.
If the parties cannot remove the potential for losses on liquidation,
the only remaining avenue for limiting leverage costs is to restructure
the transaction in order to eliminate the discretionary opportunities
that enable lenders to exercise leverage. This avenue does hold some
promise, but it does not provide a complete solution. Theoretically,
borrowers could grant a "bare" security interest with no covenants
whatsoever. This approach would be impractical, however, because it
would deprive the lender of most of the benefits that motivated the
decision to take a security interest in the first place. For example, if
the bare security interest covered specified assets, the borrower could
evade the security interest by the simple expedient of selling the encumbered assets. 16 1 Similarly, a bare security interest that covered all
of the assets would hinder the borrower's ability to obtain subsequent
financing and yet provide none of the incentive-repairing benefits that
162
are the main positive attributes of secured credit.
Assuming, then, that the loan documents will contain some covenants, the best approach would be for the borrower to make the terms
of the documents as precise as possible in order to limit the likelihood
that it will commit technical defaults or be required to obtain the
lender's consent to conduct ordinary business operations. My interviews indicate that sophisticated borrowers try very hard to accomplish this goal. 163 These efforts, however, confront a serious difficulty:
nontangible investments (human capital, emotional attachments, and the like) that will cause
them to value the asset more highly than the market would. See supra note 79.
160 See supra note 74.

161 The textual discussion assumes that the applicable documents would permit the sale of the
collateral free of the debt; a restriction on the sale would impose just the sort of limitation on the
borrower's flexibility that a bare lien would be designed to avoid.
162 In cases in which the purpose of the lien is to prevent future borrowing, that would not be
a problem. See supra pp. 641-45 (discussing that motivation for secured credit). Accordingly, it is
plausible that the bare-blanket-lien approach might be useful in those cases. Preliminary results
of empirical research I am conducting suggest that something like that approach occurs in smallbusiness loans from banks.
163 In the context of commercial real estate lending, for example, the borrower often attempts
to limit the lender's power to block the disbursement of insurance and condemnation proceeds for
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drafting precise language that allows the lender to prevent excessive

risk-taking or outright injury often also leaves the lender with the opportunity to impose its preferences on the borrower. Thus, although

sophisticated parties try to limit leverage, they are unlikely to remove
it entirely. Indeed, it is a fairly common perception among commercial

borrowers and lenders that even conscientious commercial borrowers
cannot refrain from committing technical defaults that give the lender

the power to take action. 164 And if the lender always has the power to
take action against the borrower, the prospect that the lender will use

that power to harm the borrower will increase the borrower's up-front
assessment of the cost of the loan. This effect, in turn, will make se-

cured credit less desirable than unsecured credit.

The foregoing discussion of the benefits and burdens of secured
credit provides a framework for analyzing how borrowers and lenders

decide whether to include collateral in the structure of their transactions. The possible benefits include not only the direct enhancement of

the lender's ability to collect its debt forcibly, but also indirect effects
that substantially increase the likelihood that the borrower will be in a

position to, and choose to, repay the debt without forcible collection.
All of these benefits work together to lower the lender's pre-loan per-

ception of the risk of nonpayment, allowing the lender to make a profitable loan at a lower interest rate or on more lenient terms. On the

down side, the parties also must consider the corresponding burdens.
For large companies, secured credit is likely to carry with it a signifi-

cant increase in the information costs of the lending transaction. More
rebuilding and the lender's ability to require the borrower to seek the lender's consent for new
leases (or significant modifications of old leases) of portions of the collateral. See Coburn Interview, supra note 54 (transcript at 27) (statement of bank's real estate loan officer) (explaining that
these provisions are among the ones that borrowers most frequently negotiate); Office Building
Developer Interview, supra note 58 (transcript at i2)(stating that 'you do your absolute best" in
negotiating provisions that require lender approval of leases in an office building); see also Shopping Center Developer Interview, supra note 12 (transcript at 13) (stating that the developer
negotiates hard on provisions limiting ability to grant subordinate liens).
164 See Mall Developer Interview, supra note 87 (transcript at 6) (remarking with respect to a
recently refinanced project that he "would have to believe there's some minor default that we've
made - didn't get a payment in on the first of the month when it was due, maybe got it there
on the fifth - technically, it's a default"); Office Building Developer Interview, supra note 58
(transcript at ii) (agreeing that remaining in compliance with loan covenants is "relatively difficult" and stating that "[slometimes you comply and sometimes you don't"); Shopping Center Developer Interview, supra note 112 (transcript at 14) (acknowledging that he regularly is in default
for failure to submit leases to lender for approval as required by loan documents); Stuart Interview, supa note 124 (transcript at 9)(statement of the Chief Executive Officer of a closely held
computer services company) (asserting that "[tihere might be some people that are always in default" and that "[tfhere are some covenants of the loan that I sometimes don't adhere to").
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THE PATTERN OF SECURED CREDIT

Because secured credit provides both benefits and burdens to the
parties that use it, any explanation of the pattern of its use must involve an analysis of its benefits and burdens in different contexts.
This Part applies the decision-based model set forth in Parts I and I"
to three separate aspects of the pattern of secured credit: the wellknown fact that the strongest companies use secured credit with relative infrequency; the relation between the use of collateral and the duration of the debt; and the apparently low rate of retention of security
interests by suppliers.

A.

Unsecured Debt of Strong Companies

i. The Puzzle. - Although empirical evidence about the details
of the pattern of secured credit is relatively limited, a significant
amount of empirical and anecdotal evidence supports one overarching
generalization: there is a connection between the riskiness of a bor-

rower and the borrower's decision to grant collateral. 16 Whether the
borrower is large or small, doubts about the firm's financial structure
tend to be associated with secured debt. 6 Conversely, unsecured
debt is not limited to large companies; even small, privately held firms
1 67
issue unsecured debt in appropriate circumstances.

16S See, e.g., Berger & Udell, supra note 15, at 27-40 (concluding, based on a study of Federal

Reserve data on over one million business loans, that collateral is more frequently granted on
riskier loans); see also Leeth & Scott, supra note 107, at 389 (noting that the presence of unsecured debt is associated with the age of a firm and arguing that age is a proxy for diminishing
riskiness). For evidence that the use of security interests in Japan rises with the riskiness of the
loan, see TosMmmo Homucm, MAIN BANK COMPETIION AND THE LOAN MARKET 48-60
(1988), which bases its conclusion on a 1983-84 survey of 8ooo small and mid-sized Japanese
companies. For anecdotal evidence, see Berger & Udell, cited above in note 15, at 27, which
describes the "conventional wisdom in banking which holds that riskier borrowers are more likely
to pledge collateral," and Kripke, cited above in note i5, at 944 n.48, which states that it "frequently happens [that a business] becomes profitable enough to graduate to unsecured credit."
166 See, e.g., Robertson Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 17-19) (describing various reasons why publicly traded companies issue secured debt); White, supra note 15, at 473-75 (discussing a grant by Pan American World Airways of security interest in aircraft); see also LoPucki,
supra note 8, at 1928-29 (predicting that large companies will grant security "when the threat of
[tort] claims is significant").
167 See, e.g., James R_ Booth, Contract Costs, Bank Loans, and the Cross-MonitoringHypothesis, 31

J.

FIN. ECON. 25, 32 (1992) (presenting the findings of a study of almost 8oo commercial

loans indicating that over 40% of the loans issued by firms with privately held equity were unsecured); Leeth & Scott, supra note 107, at 387 (suggesting, based on a random sampling of
Soo,ooo members of the National Federation of Independent Businesses, that more than 35% of
the loans were unsecured); DeKunder Interview, supra note 58 (transcript at 12-13) (discussing
the practice of making an unsecured loan to allow a small business to purchase equipment).
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2. Earlier Explanations. Given the likelihood that
creditworthy companies are financially sophisticated and given the obvious benefits that secured transactions can offer in some contexts, any
useful discussion of the pattern of secured credit must provide a coherent explanation for the general dearth of secured credit among companies with excellent credit ratings. Although that puzzle has attracted
the attention of several scholars, none has provided a satisfactory explanation of the empirical evidence. 168
The most sustained attempt to explain the relative absence of secured debt from the balance sheets of certain companies is Barry Adler's 1993 article in the Journal of Legal Studies.169 In contrast to the
decision-based model presented above, Adler's analysis does not identify any costs attributable to secured credit. 70 Accordingly, he cannot
ascribe the use of unsecured credit to any defects in secured credit.
Instead, he ascribes the existence of unsecured credit to the potential
for unsecured creditors to provide monitoring that benefits equity investors, thus linking unsecured lending to firms with dispersed equity
7
investors.' '
This analysis suffers from several basic flaws. First, at a theoretical level, Adler cannot explain why the interests of unsecured creditors
should match the interests of equity investors so closely that equity
investors would trust unsecured creditors to protect them. Because the
unsecured creditors' share of the risks of the business differs qualitatively from the equity investors' share, monitoring by unsecured creditors is unlikely to provide adequate protection to dispersed equity
72
investors.
168 Neither of the major empirical studies identifying the connection between collateral and
risk undertakes to provide a theoretical explanation. Berger and Udell simply note that their
empirical result "is not the result predicted by the majority of theoretical studies." Berger &
Udell, supra note i5,at 40. None of the studies that they cite explains the correlation between
risk and collateral. See id. at 23-27 (discussing prior literature). Leeth and Scott come the closest
to understanding the relationship when they suggest in passing that "firms with high probabilities
of bankruptcy will find that the benefits of secured debt outweigh the costs, while firms with low
probabilities of bankruptcy will find that the costs outweigh the benefits." Leeth & Scott, supra
note 107, at 383. Leeth and Scott do not, however, explain why firms will draw that conclusion.
169 Adler, supra note 7.
170 "The only cost necessarily attributable to secured, as compared to unsecured, credit is that
from the ministerial task of public recordation." Id. at 79.
171 See id. at 89-98.

172 Cf.Shupack, supra note 49, at 782 n.16 (arguing that secured creditor monitoring will not
help unsecured creditors). Adler addresses this point at length, see Adler, supra note 7, at 87-94
(acknowledging that secured creditor monitoring will not help equity holders, but arguing that
unsecured creditor monitoring will), but he does not acknowledge the differentiation of incentives
between unsecured creditors and equity investors. This differentiation suggests that equity investors are unlikely to rely seriously on monitoring by unsecured creditors. In fact, the little direct
empirical evidence that exists strongly undercuts Adler's thesis. Randall Morck and Masao
Nakamura have concluded, based on a regression study of large Japanese firms in the 298os, that
leading unsecured creditors of Japanese firms are much more likely to intervene to protect their
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Second, even Adler never argues that the dispersed holders of publicly traded unsecured debt are any more capable of monitoring than
the dispersed equity investors themselves. Rather, he is reduced to arguing that the benefit of the unsecured debt comes from the pre-loan
investigation conducted by investment banks underwriting the debt for
17
the dispersed parties that will buy it.
3 It is difficult to see, however,
why that investigation should be any more thorough than the investigation that precedes an equity issue. Indeed, contrary to Adler's thesis, my interviews suggest that monitoring by third parties rating
equity issues tends to be more intrusive than monitoring by debt, not
less intrusive. 17 4 Also, as Adler himself acknowledges, his thesis does
nothing to explain the evidence related to small firms with unsecured
debt:' 75 contrary to the prediction that Adler offers, many firms with176
out widely dispersed investors do issue unsecured debt.
Finally, the fundamental difficulty with Adler's thesis is that his
attempt to tie unsecured credit to public ownership does not match the
empirical evidence about unsecured debt. This evidence links unsecured credit to low risk, which is quite distinct from public ownership. Because Adler explains a relationship that is different from the
one that occurs in the marketplace, his analysis has little value in revealing the actual pattern of secured credit.
Bob Scott and Lynn LoPucki also have addressed the question in
passing in the course of scholarship devoted to other topics, but their
suggestions fit the evidence no better than Adler's. Scott suggests that
the predominance of unsecured debt in large companies is attributable
to their ability to "exploit the economies of scale necessary to [assess
the risks and] effects of financial decisions.' 77 That explanation, howinterest in being repaid than to protect stock prices in general. See RANDALL MORCK & MASAO
NAKAMURA, BANKS AND CORPORATE CONTROL IN JAPAN 30-31 (Institute for Fin. Research,
Faculty of Bus., Univ. of Alberta, Working Paper No. 6-92, 1994) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 153, at 82-84 (discussing the Morck and
Nakamura study).
173 See Adler, supra note 7, at 90-92.
174 See Robertson Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 9);see also KAHAN & TUCKMAN,
supra note 97, at 17-23 (presenting empirical evidence of the relative ineffectiveness of monitoring
of borrowers through publicly traded unsecured debt agreements).
175 See Adler, supra note 7,at 89 n.66 ("[T]he arguments that follow offer no explanation for
the use of unsecured credit in small firms with unencumbered but encumberable assets.').
176 Adler predicts that "discretionary unsecured credit," by which he means unsecured credit
issued "despite the availability of unencumbered encumberable assets," will vary directly with the
concentration of a firm's equity interest. Adler, supra note 7, at 96 & n.85. For contrary empirical evidence, see notes 166 and 167 above, which discuss the issuance of secured debt by public
firms and unsecured debt by private firms.
177 Scott, supa note 12, at 941. It is not clear how to relate this comment to Scott's general
argument that secured lending benefits borrowers by fostering exclusive lending relationships. See
supra pp. 6s6-58 (criticizing that argument). I take Scott's comment as his justification for the
perceived absence of those beneficial secured lending relationships from large companies.
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ever, is belied by the frequent issuance of unsecured debt by small
companies. 178 Just as Adler errs in directing his focus to the borrower's organizational structure, Scott errs in attempting to explain
the pattern of secured credit through reference to the borrower's size
rather than its financial strength. Because the empirical evidence suggests that the touchstone is strength, 17 9 Scott's explanation is
unpersuasive.
Lynn LoPucki argues that, when the managers of large companies
issue unsecured debt, they "sacrific[e] the best interests of their companies to render their own positions less precarious." 8 0 That argument
rests on the dubious premise that the entire institution of unsecured
lending to this nation's strongest companies is in fact harmful to the
companies' shareholders. LoPucki's premise is difficult to reconcile
with my research, which indicates that the agencies that watch strong
companies most closely not only refrain from criticizing unsecured
credit, but in fact demand it. For example, the chief financial officer
of one publicly rated borrower explained that his company had
worked hard to get rid of its secured debt because the rating agencies
had "insisted" on his company's compliance with a strict limitation on
secured debt.' 8" This type of anecdotal evidence, coupled with the
strong theoretical evidence about the costs of secured credit adduced
in section ll.B, indicates that a strong company's unsecured borrowing
is more likely to be related to the relative advantages of that transaction than to a supposed pattern of persistent misconduct by corporate
managers.
3. Decision-Based Analysis. - Considered in light of the decision-based model presented above, the solution to the puzzle of the
unsecured debt of strong companies is obvious. As explained in section I.A, the benefits of secured credit work together to reduce the
parties' pre-loan expectation of default. With respect to strong companies, that reduction is quite limited.' 8 - When a company has a strong
balance sheet, 8 3 the lender advancing funds may view the risk of non-

See supra note 167.
See supra note 165.
180 LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1930.
181 See Robertson Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at i).
178
179

182 1 am not the first to suggest that the pattern of secured credit is influenced by the inverse
relationship between the benefits of secured credit and a firm's financial strength. See Thantis,

supra note ii, at 256-57. Although insightful, Triantis's relatively abstract analysis does not ex-

plain how financial strength influences a borrower's decision to choose unsecured credit. Moreover, his analysis focuses on a very limited number of the factors that influence the decision, thus
obscuring the wealth of relevant considerations that this Article identifies.
183 For a discussion of what I mean when I refer to a company as "strong," see note 130
above.
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payment as insignificant'8 4 even in the absence of collateral. 8 5 In

cases in which that is true, a grant of collateral -

however solid

-

can do little to decrease the lender's (already minimal) perceived risk

of nonpayment.8

6

The idea that the credit quality of many borrowers

who obtain unsecured loans is so high that the loans are extraordi-

narily safe is consistent with several earlier empirical studies; these
studies suggest that unsecured bank loans tend to have lower risk pre8
miums and less frequent defaults than secured bank loans.

7

184 Nonetheless, publicly traded companies occasionally go into bankruptcy with large amounts
of unsecured debt. See LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1927 n.I53 (examining 42 large publicly traded
bankrupt debtors that had bank debt outstanding at the time of their bankruptcy filings and
observing that 28 had wholly or substantially unsecured bank debt). But that does not prove that
lenders err in their general willingness to make unsecured loans to companies of apparent
strength. There is always some risk of default, no matter how strong the borrower is at the time
of the loan. See Edward I. Altman, Measuring CorporateBond Mortality and Performance, 44 J.
FIN. 9o9, 9r5 (1989) (reporting a study indicating a cumulative rate of default of 0.13% for AAAgrade bonds during the first xo years after the date of issuance).
185 The market demonstrates the relation between interest rates and the borrower's
creditworthiness by producing lower interest rates on bonds that are sold by companies with
higher credit ratings. See, e.g., S & P's RATINGs GROUP, supra note i3o, at 3; Kahan, supra note
96, at 592. My interviews produced evidence that supports the existence of this connection, even
for relatively small borrowers. See, e.g., DeKunder Interview, supra note 58 (transcript at 9-12)
(discussing a willingness to deviate downward from a bank's standard interest rates for customers
with strong credit records); Telephone Interview with Anonymous Loan Officer, Anonymous Middie-Market Bank Lender (July 17, 1995) [hereinafter Middle-Market Banker Interview] (transcript
at 5,on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (stating that "pricing . . .definitely would
have been higher" on her most recent loan if the borrower had been "weaker"). A firm's
creditworthiness is a function of the size of the loan relative to the firm's ability to repay the
loan. Even the most creditworthy companies could seek loans of such a large amount, or with
such a lengthy term, that the lender would have serious doubts about the certainty of repayment.
In those cases, my analysis predicts that the parties would agree to grant collateral. See infra
note 208 (discussing difficulties that strong companies face in issuing long-term unsecured debt).
186 For example, the treasurers of two large manufacturing companies were skeptical of the
idea that a grant of collateral could increase the perceived likelihood that their companies would
repay their loans. One treasurer explained: "I think there'd be practically no value compared to
our current credit quality, practically no value to doing an offering secured by [a grant of collateral]." Kimmins Interview, supa note 67 (transcript at ii). The other treasurer stated:
[L]ook at the long-term borrowing we just did recently, where we borrowed at roughly 35
to 40 basis points above the comparable U.S. Treasury. Absent some kind of a tax-structured financing, nobody is going to borrow cheaper than the U.S. government, so there
isn't a lot of room there to reduce the cost by securing assets ....
Manufacturer Treasurer Interview, supa note 54 (transcript at 7).
187 See Berger & Udell, supra note i5,at 27-40 (discussing a study of Federal Reserve data on
over one million loans and reporting a positive correlation between the existence of collateral and
both interest charges and rate of default); Blackwell & Winters, supra note 126, at 13-14 (presenting a study of 174 bank lines of credit that indicated a statistically significant connection between
the existence of collateral and a 0.33% per annum increase in the interest rate); Booth, supra note
167, at 36 (presenting a study of more than 220o commercial loans and reporting a positive correlation between the existence of security and the size of the interest rate); Yalr E. Orgler, A Credit
Scoring Model for Commercial Loans, 2 J. MONEY, CREDrr & BANKING 435, 440 (1970) (presenting a study of 3oo loans chosen randomly from the portfolio of East Coast banks suggesting a
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Looking to the other side of the ledger, there is no reason to think
that the creditworthiness of a borrower generally will decrease the
burdens of secured credit. The principal general cost of secured credit
is the cost to a borrower of enduring supervision by a third party not
directly motivated to maximize the enterprise's profit.' s8 That cost
harms a creditworthy borrower just as much as a borrower of questionable strength. Indeed, if the more creditworthy borrowers are also
more sophisticated, the costs of the supervision might be even greater.
For example, knowledgeable borrowers are more likely than weaker
borrowers to engage in the kind of deliberate assessment of risks that
might cause lenders to oppose value-increasing decisions. Also, because knowledgeable borrowers may be more aware of the burdens
that a secured transaction might create over the course of performance, they may be more likely to account for those burdens in evaluating the total cost of the transaction.
In addition to that general risk-based explanation, the ready availability of information about public companies enhances the relative advantage of unsecured credit for those companies in two specific ways.
First, unsecured transactions rely on information about the firm's general financial strength that is available without significant additional
expense; secured transactions, by contrast, require asset-specific information that needs to be generated for each transaction. 8 9 Second,
public companies have a strong interest in maintaining a good reputation for creditworthiness because they depend on frequent access to
the financial markets.' 90 This interest gives even unsecured creditors
significant leverage over those companies, thus lessening the relative
benefit to those creditors of a secured transaction.' 9' A major unsecured lender that declares a default against such a borrower could
inflict substantial harm on the borrower - without regard to the
lender's ability to liquidate the borrower's assets - because the declaration of default would be likely to limit the borrower's future access
positive correlation between the existence of collateral and the likelihood that bank examiners
would criticize the loan).
My interviews with lenders produced additional evidence to support the idea that unsecured
loans axe safer than secured loans. Specifically, two lenders who make both secured and unsecured loans indicated that they believed that, after taking account of expenses, unsecured loans
tend to produce a higher rate of repayment, whether through voluntary payments, litigation, or
foreclosure. See DeKunder Interview, supra note s8 (transcript at 26) ("I would think that our
experience . . . in unsecured loans might be better than secured loans, because we make unsecured loans typically to the more creditworthy customers."); Mueller Interview, supra note 54
(transcript at 14-15) (explaining that most of his bank's losses during the last recession were on
secured loans).
188 See supra pp. 663-67.
189 See supra pp. 66o-6i.

190 See supra note 7o and accompanying text.
191 See supra note 88.
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to the funds that it needs to operate its business. 192 To the extent that
many of the strongest companies are publicly traded, that effect reinforces the other factors discussed above.
In sum, as a borrower's financial strength increases, secured credit
becomes a less attractive alternative: its benefits decrease and its costs,
at best, remain constant. Responding to this effect, borrowers exhibit
an increasing tendency toward unsecured debt as their financial
1 93
strength increases.
B. Long-Term Debt and Collateral
The relation between the existence of collateral and the term of the
loan has preoccupied commentators ever since Jackson and Kronman's
1979 prediction that "one would expect long-term loans to be made on
a secured basis more frequently than short-term loans.' 94 Jackson
and Kronman rested that prediction on their view that monitoring is
the chief reason for secured credit and their belief that a debtor has
"more opportunities . . .for subtle forms of misbehavior" during loans
with longer periods. 9 s Although some scholars have supported this
analysis, 96 others have attacked it on a variety of grounds. For example, Kripke has argued, contrary to Jackson and Kronman's premise,
that short-term credit can be just as risky as long-term credit.' 97
Others have contended that Jackson and Kronman's analysis produces
predictions that do not comport with reality.'9 8

192 The effectiveness of reputation-based leverage depends on the borrower's need to return to
the market frequently and the market's rapid dissemination of information about them. First, the
need to return to the market enhances the significance of reputation to the borrower. See
Charny, supra note 56, at 393; Shell, supra note 12o, at 268-69. Second, "improper" actions by a

borrower, such as a default, will affect the borrower only if the market disseminates that information effectively. See Charny, supra note 56, at 420; Shell, supra note 12o, at 269-71.
193 My analysis does not preclude the possibility that strong borrowers could benefit from the
issuance of secured debt. For example, even companies with impressive credit ratings may find
obtaining long-term unsecured debt expensive. In those cases, the grant of collateral can reduce
the costs of financing considerably. See infra note 208.
194 Jackson & Kronman, supra note 5, at ii59.
19sId.
196 See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 12, at 1444 & n.102 ("The risk of debtor misbehavior also

seems proportional to the length of the loan ....[T]he reality that banks, the most typical secured
creditors, are generally long term creditors ...support[s] the costly monitoring hypothesis.");
Leeth & Scott, supra note io7, at 384.
197 See Kripke, supra note 15, at 949-50; see also Adler, supra note 7, at 8o-8i (arguing that

Alan Schwartz understates the degree of risk associated with short-term loans).
'98 See, e.g., Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security
Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 8o VA.L. REV. 2021, 2028 n.17 (1994) (asserting that
"examples of long-term unsecured debt abound"); Schwartz, supra note 5, at 13-14 (arguing that
Jackson and Kronman's thesis is "seriously embarrassed" by the substantial amount of short-term
secured debt).
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To make sense of the relation between collateral and the term of a
loan, 19 9 it is necessary to start by considering the scanty empirical evidence that is available. John Leeth and Jonathan Scott conducted the
only full-scale empirical study on the topic of which I am aware.
They examined 25oo responses to a questionnaire sent to members of
the National Federation of Independent Businesses (a small-business
trade group). 200 Leeth and Scott concluded that there is a statistically
significant correlation, albeit a small one, between the existence of secured credit and the length of the loan term: the longer the loan, the
20 1
more likely it is to be secured.
The most important point that I draw from the relatively small
effect that Leeth and Scott identify is that the economy contains a
substantial amount of all of the relevant categories of debt: long-term
secured, long-term unsecured, short-term secured, and short-term unsecured. This statistical conclusion should not be surprising. Anyone
familiar with the commercial marketplace can think of common transactions in each of the four categories: long-term secured commercial
real estate mortgages; long-term unsecured corporate bonds; short-term
199 I acknowledge a certain subjectivity inherent in any discussion of the term of a loan. Many
loans normally characterized as short term, because the lender has the right to demand immediate
payment at any time, might as a practical matter involve relatively lengthy relationships. See
Schwartz, supra note 5, at 12-13. On the other hand, loans that have a long stated term will not

necessarily involve a relationship of that length because of the possibility that the loan will be
called or repaid before the stated maturity date. Nevertheless, the distinction between a loan that
is payable on demand (or after a short stated period like 30 to go days) and a loan that is not
payable for decades unless the borrower defaults is sufficiently substantial to justify considering
the relation between this distinction and collateral. My belief that the distinction has significance
is supported by evidence from my interviews that both borrowers and lenders regard the length of
the stated term as a crucial factor in evaluating proposed loan transactions. See, e.g., Kimmins
Interview, supra note 67 (transcript at 4-5) (statement by the treasurer of a Fortune zoo manufacturing company) (stating that the interest rate that his company pays to borrow money with a
maturity of 20 years is about 35 basis points higher than the rate that the company would pay to
borrow money with a maturity of one year); Massie Interview, supra note 54 (transcript at 2-3, 5)
(statement by the investment officer for a life insurance company) (expressing his concerns about
negotiating an unsecured loan with a term of 20 years).
200 See Leeth & Scott, supra note 107, at 386. Two other studies upon which this article relies,
Berger and Udell's study and Booth's study, also considered the duration of the loan, but they
correlated it only against the risk premium and not against the existence of collateral. See Berger
& Udell, supa note 15, at 3o-3z; Booth, supra note 167, at 36.
201 Leeth and Scott analyzed data from two years, i98o and 1982. The 198o data suggested
that a one-year increase of the term of a loan would increase the likelihood of collateral by 3.6%;
an increase of the term of one standard deviation above the mean increased the likelihood of
collateral by i2.i%. See Leeth & Scott, supra note 107, at 389. The findings related to term were
statistically significant at the i% level. See id. at 39o. The figures from 1982 suggested an even
smaller effect. See id. at 389 (reporting that a one-year increase in term generated a 14% increase in the probability of collateral and that an increase of one standard deviation created a 6%
increase). For a less detailed study from Japan that reaches a similar conclusion, see HoaRucfH,
cited above in note i65, at 51-52, which presents statistical evidence that in Japan the prevalence
of real estate as collateral for a loan increases with the term of the loan.
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secured working-capital loans; and short-term unsecured commercial
paper. Accordingly, the statistical evidence, coupled with anecdotal
impressions of the marketplace, seriously undermines any explanation
of security that predicts that any of those categories would be nonexistent or even rare. Nevertheless, one question still remains: why is
there any connection at all between the length of the loan and the
presence of security? My answer to this question, like my answer to
the strong-company problem in section IH.A, focuses on the capacity
of collateral to decrease the lender's pre-loan assessment of risk.
Strong companies tend to issue relatively little secured debt because a grant of collateral provides no significant benefit to the parties. 20 2 In the context of long-term lending, on the other hand,
granting collateral can provide a significant benefit to the parties.
Whether a company's strength will endure for decades into the future
is quite difficult to predict. In our increasingly unitary global economy, all but the most unusual companies face risks from competition,
development of new technologies, alteration of consumer demands, or
departure of key personnel. 20 3 Hence, when a lender relies on a company's general strength for repayment, the lender's pre-loan assessment of the risk of nonpayment should rise significantly as the term of
the loan increases. 20 4 In contrast, many types of collateral are relatively likely to retain their value into the future. For example, a single
Manhattan office building is much more likely to retain its value for
thirty years than is the balance sheet of the developer that owns it.205
Hence, even for borrowers of redoubtable current strength, a grant of
a lien on a particularly durable asset could decrease the aggregate
costs of a long-term transaction significantly. Conversely, on the cost
side, as with loans to strong borrowers, there is no general reason to
See supra section IIA.
See, e.g., RUTH, supra note 55, at 249; infra note 208 (discussing the market perception of
the long-term risks for Hewlett-Packard).
204 See Kimmins Interview, supra note 67 (transcript at 4-5) (statement of the treasurer of a
Fortune ioo manufacturer) (describing a schedule of increases in the default-risk premium that his
company pays as the term of the loan increases); RUTH, supra note 55, at 248-49 (American
Bankers Association textbook) (listing the term of the loan as one of eight factors that a loan
officer should consider in deciding between a secured and unsecured loan). One bank officer
explained the problems of extending the term of an unsecured loan: "You may have a borrower
who's very strong and very liquid, and you make a loan on an unsecured basis, a loan that spans
a two or three year period of time. During that period of time, their financial condition can
change dramatically." Coburn Interview, supra note 54 (transcript at 4).
20S See Hamstra Interview, supra note 70 (transcript at 6) (statement of an insurance company
lender) (explaining that she is more comfortable about the long-term values of specific assets on
which she has a lien than about the company's long-term general credit); see also DeKunder
Interview, supra note 58 (transcript at 7-9, 13) (explaining that the institution's standard products
for secured small-business loans generally have a longer term than standard products for unsecured business loans of a comparable size to comparable borrowers, and that five years "would
be the outside on an unsecured loan" to a small business).
202
203
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believe that the burdens of secured credit will increase as the term of
20 6
the loan increases.
This pattern of factors - increasing benefits from secured credit
without any change in its burdens - is consistent with the observed
increase in the use of collateral as the term of the debt increases. Indeed, the correlation between financial strength and, unsecured debt
should strengthen as the term of the loan increases. Companies of varying strength should be able to obtain short-term unsecured debt
based on current business patterns, but companies of questionable financial strength should rarely be able to issue long-term unsecured
20 7

debt.

This framework also offers a ready explanation for the substantial
amount of long-term unsecured debt. Long-term unsecured debt
makes sense when the company's financial condition is strong enough
to minimize the possible benefits of secured credit, even considered
over a long term. Current strength is not enough; the borrower must
be able to persuade lenders that its financial strength is not likely to
20 8
diminish over time.
In sum, my evaluation of the empirical evidence in light of my
decision-based model suggests a relation not all that different from
Jackson and Kronman's: a preference for collateral that increases significantly with the term of the loan. The empirical grounding of my
explanation, however, makes it significantly more plausible and valuable than their more tentative theoretical explanation.
C.

The Unsecured Debt of Inventory Suppliers

One of the most common topics in the debate about secured credit
has been the relations between trade creditors and the businesses to
which they sell. Almost all of the scholars have started with the question that Jackson and Kronman first asked: why do inventory suppli-

206 If anything, my interviews suggest that the relative burdens of secured credit fall as the
term of the loan increases because a longer term spurs unsecured lenders to toughen their documents. See Massie Interview, supra note 54 (transcript at 2-3, 5) (describing how the inability of
his company to agree on appropriate loan covenants for a 2o-year unsecured loan to an A -rated
borrower eventually resulted in the transaction being changed to a secured loan).
207 This view is consistent with the results of my study. The only company in my sample that
has a substantial amount of long-term unsecured debt is a Fortune ioo manufacturer with an AA
credit rating. See Kimmins Interview, supra note 67 (transcript at 3-4); see also CAREY, PROWSE,
REA & UDELL, supra note 141, at 17-19 (concluding that borrowers that are "information problematic" sometimes cannot obtain long-term debt and instead must "give up an equity interest in

the firm").
208 See, e.g., Edlund Interview, supra note 102 (transcript at 7) (statement of the corporate
borrowing manager for an AA-rated computer company) (explaining that one of the factors limiting his company's long-term debt is the market's perception that technology companies face significant risks over long periods of time).
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ers often not retain a security interest in the goods that they sell?20 9
Jackson and Kronman, for example, have argued that trade creditors
are so knowledgeable about their customers that they have no need for
a security interest.2 10 Kripke tried to explain that same relationship
when he argued that third-party financing is the only practical way to
provide for prompt payment of suppliers in situations in which the
2
ultimate consumers purchase on credit. 11
These discussions are flawed because they fail to make any serious
attempt to discover whether and when suppliers actually retain security interests. 2 1 2

My interviews with several players in the inventory-

supply market strongly suggest that the pattern that prior scholars
have tried to explain does not in fact exist. Rather, a significant (and
apparently growing) portion of sophisticated suppliers do retain security interests in the materials that they sell. For example, two different
credit officers at a multibillion dollar asset-based financier assured me
that the retention of security interests by inventory sellers is not uncommon.2 1 3 Similarly, a credit executive for Hewlett-Packard said
that her company has a practice of taking security interests from its
customers, especially high-volume retailers. 214 Finally, the director of
209

Jackson and Kronman do not expressly argue that trade creditors never retain a security

interest. They do argue, however, that allowing a bank that lends to the purchaser to have priority instead would be efficient for the parties. See Jackson & Kronran, supra note 5, at 1x6o-6.
Other scholars, however, have claimed that trade creditors in fact do not retain security interests.
See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 12, at 1441-42; LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1936, 1941-43.
210 See Jackson & Kromnan, supra note 5, at 1i6o-6i. This explanation has been strongly
criticized on the ground that trade creditors are not sophisticated monitors. See Buckley, supra
note 12, at 1441-42; Schwartz, supra note 5, at ii n.28.
211 See Kripke, supra note i5, at 941-46, 959-60; see also Interview with James C. Meals,

Director, Portfolio Credit, Deutsche Financial Services Corporation (formerly known as ITT Commercial Finance Corporation), in St. Louis, Mo. (July io, 1995) [hereinafter Meals Interview]
(transcript at 3-4, on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (explaining how his company's
loans to retailers "provid[e] the manufacturer improved cash flow").
212 Other scholars have noticed this problem. See Kripke, supra note 15, at 944-45, 96o n.xxo;
LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1894. The lack of data has not stopped those scholars, however, from
proceeding to attempt to explain the hypothesized pattern. See Kripke, supra note IS, at 941-46,
959-6o (arguing that the pattern rests on the benefits of purchaser financing); LoPucki, supra note
8, at 1941-43 (attributing the pattern to the refusal of the purchaser's lender to permit
subordinate financing).
213 See Greco Interview, supra note 67 (transcript at 6-8) (discussing the retention of security
interests by major tire manufacturers such as Michelin, Dunlop, Kelly-Springfield, and PirelliArmstrong); Meals Interview, supra note 211 (transcript at 4-7) (discussing the retention of security interests by a large agricultural manufacturer, Sharp, and by Sony, RCA, and Apple on some
accounts).
214 See Dunn Interview, supra note 67 (transcript at 3-5). This executive also said that most
of the suppliers in her industry had similar credit practices. See id. (transcript at 5-6). She
further explained that, even in the cases in which Hewlett-Packard would accept a position
subordinate to the position of a finance company (such as Deutsche Financial Services), HewlettPackard ordinarily would insist that the finance company guarantee payment of the invoice. See
id. (transcript at 7). As a result, Hewlett-Packard's subordinate position would not leave it ex-
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credit for a multinational battery supplier told me that his company

had started an "experimental effort with new accounts" and was having "very good success" in persuading new customers to grant security
21
interests. s

The important question, then, is not why inventory suppliers never

retain security interests (because they do), but why some suppliers retain security interests when others do not.2 16 This question is qualita-

tively different from the questions treated in the preceding two
sections, because it assumes that the credit at issue (the credit ex-

tended to allow a retailer to purchase inventory) will be secured by at
least one party and then asks how the parties determine who will get

the first priority. Thus, the relevant decision is more complicated than
the decisions considered above: the borrower must decide whether to
purchase the inventory without granting a lien at all, whether to grant

a lien to the supplier, or whether to grant a lien to a lender that advances funds to pay the supplier on the borrower's behalf. Moreover,

the available empirical evidence for this question does not contain the
kind of general correlation that appears in the empirical evidence on

the strong-borrower and long-term problems. Rather, the empirical
evidence here suggests that the factors influencing the decisions of bor2 17
rowers differ significantly from industry to industry.

Although my interviews provide evidence that suggests some gen-

eral factors, my evidence is not sufficient to explain the entire pattern.
Accordingly, the contribution of this Article is more limited for this
posed to a risk of loss if the customer became insolvent and the finance company took the inventory in satisfaction of its loan. See id. (transcript at 8).
215 Wirengard Interview, supra note 65 (transcript at 3).
216 1 did speak to representatives of two inventory suppliers that do not retain security interests in inventory that they sell. Both companies, however, are large, publicly traded manufacturers that have small credit losses. One explained: "We have very good credit experience. We have
obviously some bad debt expense, every company does, but it's really at a very, very low level
relative to the spread of risk that we have in our receivables portfolio. It's quite acceptable."
Manufacturer Treasurer Interview, supra note 54 (transcript at 8). The other one indicated that
"[c]redit losses for my company are practically nonexistent," Kimmins Interview, supra note 67
(transcript at 14). He went on to explain two mechanisms other than security interests that protect the supplier. First, his company conducts annual credit evaluations of its distributors before
selling product to them. See id. (transcript at x5). Second, his company arranges to collect the
price of the inventory by a prearranged debit transfer that typically occurs no more than nine
days after each shipment. See id. (transcript at 13-15).
217 See Greco Interview, supra note 67 (transcript at 17-18) (suggesting that the practice of
retaining security interests differs on an industry-by-industry basis); Wirengard Interview, supra
note 65 (transcript at 2) (stating that his company's credit terms differ depending on the line of
business of the purchaser); ef. Dunn Interview, supra note 67 (transcript at 2) (explaining that her
company's credit terms are "geography driven," responsive to the custom of local markets); Edlund Interview, supra note 102 (transcript at 9) (echoing Dunn's comments, with particular reference to southern Europe); Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Benefits of Lending
Relationships: Evidencefrom Small Business Data, 49 J. FIN. 3, 22 (1994) (empirical study showing the statistical significance of line of business to credit patterns).
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puzzle than for the others. The most that I can do is to suggest two
factors gleaned from my interviews that seem to drive the securedcredit decisions in some inventory-supply contexts.
The first significant factor is the extent to which suppliers use security as a pricing tool. It is no surprise to hear suppliers say that the
"terms [on which they extend credit] are considered to be part of pricing" and that the extent of price competition for a particular sale is a
significant factor in the determination of credit terms. 218 The grant of
security is relevant to the supplier only because that grant increases
the likelihood that the purchaser will pay for the goods that it
purchases, which indirectly increases the effective price that the supplier receives for the sale. Thus, a grant of security is functionally
identical to an increase in the premium charged for deferred payment:
both indirectly alter the effective purchase price. 219 Accordingly, in
situations in which price competition calls for discounting to maintain
the volume of sales, suppliers should be less concerned about receiving
payment of the full nominal purchase price and thus more willing to
sell unsecured, even when there is some cognizable chance that they
will not be repaid.
The second factor arises from the mechanics of distributing the
supplier's products. Specifically, my evidence suggests that a manufacturer will be more likely to retain security in industries in which
dealers purchase inventory from only a small number of manufactur218 Wirengard Interview, supra note 65 (transcript at 2); see also Petersen & Rajan, supra note
217, at 20 n.17 (discussing the relation between a manufacturer's pricing flexibility and the terms

of credit that it offers); Dunn Interview, supra note 67 (transcript at io)(describing credit as
"much more a part of the sales process than it is part of the finance function").
219 Lynn LoPucki has suggested that suppliers do not alter their credit terms to account for the
riskiness of a purchaser, arguing that suppliers protect themselves instead by "cash-flow surfing"
- monitoring the borrower's performance as reflected in credit reports. LoPucki, supra note 8, at
1935-36, 1941-43. Bebchuk and Fried share this view. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 71, at
886-87. As explained in detail in earlier discussion, LoPucki errs in arguing that unsecured lenders to small businesses can protect themselves by monitoring credit reports. See supra notes
65-67 and accompanying text. LoPucki also errs to the extent that he suggests that the credit
terms offered by suppliers do not take account of the riskiness of the purchasers. Inventory suppliers have several ways to discriminate based on the creditworthiness of their customers. First,
suppliers can insist on cash payments from purchasers of doubtful financial strength. See Petersen & Rajan, supra note 217, at 23 (indicating that larger and older firms are more likely to
purchase on credit); see also Dunn Interview, supra note 67 (transcript at 3-4) (describing the care
with which Hewlett-Packard assesses the amount of credit to extend to customers). Second, because weaker firms are much less likely to take advantage of discounts for prompt payment,
inventory suppliers effectively charge much higher interest rates to weak credits than they do to
strong credits. See Petersen & Rajan, supra note 217, at 25. Third, and most important for this
Article, suppliers use collateral to protect themselves against the risk of selling to weaker purchasers. See, e.g., Wirengard Interview, supra note 65 (transcript at 3) (explaining that his effort to
take security interests from new accounts is focused on "smaller, riskier" accounts); id. (transcript
at 7) (explaining that most secured accounts involve customers that do not "hav[e] strong
finances").
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ers and will be less likely to retain security in industries in which dealers purchase inventory from a large number of manufacturers. If a
dealer purchases all of its inventory from a single manufacturer, manufacturer financing would be just as cost-effective as dealer financing:
in either case there would be only a single financing transaction for
each dealer. Although manufacturers are not traditionally viewed as
sophisticated lenders, my interviews suggest that manufacturers are
just as capable of monitoring the condition of their retail customers as
are the more visible asset-based institutional lenders who engage in
the same type of lending. 220 For example, the director of credit for a
major battery supplier explained that the retention of security interests
by manufacturers is uncommon in many industries due to the impracticality of requiring each of the suppliers of a major retail purchaser to
file financing statements in each of the jurisdictions in which the purchaser has operations. 22 1 Conversely, the same individual also explained that his company was much more successful in retaining
security interests from purchasers "where someone may depend largely
on our product," explaining that "the larger our presence, the greater
our opportunity of having [security] agreements completed and
signed."222 Thus, although I argue above that filing costs do not generally influence the decision whether to grant collateral, the multiplesupplier scenario presents a situation in which filing costs can have a
dispositive effect.
The two factors that I have identified do not explain all of the
instances in which suppliers retain security interests. For example,
some of my interviews indicated that suppliers retain security interests
from dealers who purchase from multiple manufacturers. 22 3 Furthermore, relevant incentives other than the two discussed above clearly
exist.22 4 The problem, of course, is that the lack of information about
220 See Meals Interview, supra note 211 (transcript at 4-5) (explaining how suppliers that retain security interests "utiliz[e] the same types of management techniques that are involved in
inventory financing [including] inventory audits ...and so forth"); Wirengard Interview, supra
note 65 (transcript at 6) (explaining that the lighting products division of General Electric has "a
full department of people" to monitor financing that the company extends to its customers).
221 See Wirengard Interview, supra note 65 (transcript at 7).
222 Id.
223 See Dunn Interview, supra note 67 (transcript at 5-6) (describing the use of this arrangement in the computer industry); Greco Interview, supra note 67 (transcript at 7-8) (describing the
use of this arrangement by tire manufacturers, which frequently use nonexclusive dealers); Meals
Interview, supra note 211 (transcript at 5-6) (describing the use of this arrangement by an agricultural equipment supplier that used 2o% exclusive dealers and 8o% nonexclusive dealers).
224 My interviews offered some other possible characteristics of industries that might lead suppliers to retain security interests. For example, one asset-based financier suggested that the suppliers that retain security interests in all or most of their products tend to be the suppliers that
sell big-ticket items (such as copiers and agricultural equipment). See Meals Interview, supra note
211 (transcript at 6). A second lender at the same company suggested that suppliers tend to retain
security interests not necessarily in big-ticket items, but in items that turn over slowly. See Greco
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the types of suppliers that retain security interests makes a full explanation of the entire pattern impossible. My analysis does, however,
offer an explanation for the failure of suppliers to retain security interests more broadly and for some of the most obvious circumstances in
which suppliers retain security interests. This explanation is a considerable advance over the prior scholarship, which has endeavored to
explain a pattern without stopping to determine whether the pattern
in fact exists.
IV.

CONCLUSION: WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE?

This Article will not be the last word in the debate about the reasons for secured credit. I do hope, however, that it advances the general terms of the debate. In particular, I hope that it illustrates the
importance of empirical and contextual analysis of secured credit. As
this Article demonstrates, efforts to evaluate secured credit from a
broad theoretical perspective frequently produce explanations and predictions that are inconsistent with the basic facts about the actual pattern of lending. For example, the evidence presented in this Article
casts serious doubt on prior claims in the literature that lenders use
secured credit to cement exclusive lending relationships, that lenders to
small creditors use credit reports to monitor the day-to-day operations
of their borrowers, and that secured credit imposes no significant
transaction costs. Articulation of an abstract theory, however elegant
it may be, is not useful if the theory does not rest on a firm empirical
foundation. Because this Article's analysis is coupled with empirical
evidence, it provides a base of knowledge that can aid future scholars
whether or not they accept the conclusions presented here.
Furthermore, this Article shows the importance of attention to context. Secured credit is an area in which broad conclusions are likely to
be incorrect: suppliers do not always lend on an unsecured basis, and
large companies do not always borrow unsecured. To make a serious
effort to describe the richness of the real pattern, a theory must not
only acknowledge, but embrace, the variety of the circumstances in
which parties make lending decisions. This conclusion may frustrate
those who search for a single unifying theory for credit decisions. But
a complicated theory with explanatory value is preferable to a simple
and unitary theory that bears no relation to the actual world of
lending.
Finally, the swirling policy debates about the propriety of secured
credit make an understanding of the reasons why commercial borrowers use collateral particularly important. Much of the most prominent
Interview, supra note 67 (transcript at 17-18) (discussing the retention of security interests by tire
manufacturers).
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EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF SECURED CREDIT

recent scholarship rests on the premise that secured credit ordinarily is
motivated by the desire of borrowers to limit the pool of assets available to pay small and involuntary creditors, thus lowering the cost
that borrowers incur for the credit extended by those "nonadjusting"
creditors. 225 This scholarship suggests that secured credit does not
produce a benefit, because any costs that the borrower saves are
226
shifted to the creditors who are at risk of going unpaid.
Yet none of these scholars has offered any substantial empirical evidence that these considerations in fact motivate the structuring of
commercial lending transactions. This Article, in contrast, presents a
detailed analysis of the mechanisms by which secured credit provides
borrowers with benefits that are wholly distinguishable from the costshifting benefits condemned in the existing scholarship. Specifically,
secured credit lowers the costs of lending transactions not only by increasing the strength of the lender's legal right to force the borrower
to pay, but also by enhancing the borrower's ability to give a credible
commitment to refrain from excessive future borrowing and by limiting the borrower's ability to engage in conduct that lessens the likelihood of repayment. Although my analysis cannot disprove the
significance of prejudice to nonadjusting creditors through cost-shifting,227 this Article does provide an alternative explanation that has a

significant empirical basis and considerable explanatory power. The
power of my explanation for secured credit suggests that policymakers
should pause before proceeding with reforms 2 28 predicated on the absence of any legitimate justification for secured credit in commercial
borrowing. Law reform efforts would be much more productive if
they focused on solving the problems that prevent effective contracting
in practice rather than on eradicating problems that are likely to be
more theoretical than real.
225 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 71, at 89,-95; see also LoPucki, supra note 16, at 14
(describing debtors' use of secured debt as the "most complex and the most common of the judgment-proofing strategies").

226 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 71, at 896-97.
227 Indeed, in other work I have argued that empirical evidence can demonstrate that such a
problem exists in the financing of construction projects. See Mann, supra note 45, at 31-42.
228 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 71, at gog-ii, 913-34 (proposing a fixed-fraction
priority rule that would limit secured status to a fixed fraction of the amount of the debt, in the
range of 75%); Memorandum from Elizabeth Warren, Professor, Harvard Law School, to Council
of the American Law Institute (Apr. 25, x996) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library)
(proposing to limit secured status to 8o% of collateral value).

